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WHEN SOFT LAW MEETS HARD POLITICS: TAMING THE WILD WEST
OF NONPROFIT POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer*

ABSTRACT
Beginning in the 1990s and continuing today, many of the legal and
psychological barriers to nonprofits becoming involved in electoral politics have
fallen. At the same time, political divisions have sharpened, causing candidates,
political parties, and their supporters to scramble more aggressively for any possible
edge in winner-take-all political contests. In the face of these developments, many
nonprofits have violated the remaining legal rules applicable to their political
activity with little fear of negative consequences, especially given vague rules and a
paucity of enforcement resources. Such violations include underreporting of
political activity in government filings, fly-by-night organizations that exist only for
one election cycle in order to avoid penalties, and even organized campaigns that
encourage nonprofits to break these rules. The increasingly visible disregard of
these rules threatens not only to damage the public reputation of the nonprofit sector
as a whole, but also to undermine public respect for the rule of law more generally.
Many scholars, journalists, and others have documented the increasing
involvement of nonprofits in politics, including numerous apparent violations of the
remaining rules governing such activity. Commentators have proposed a variety of
piecemeal solutions, ranging from overhauling the existing rules to repealing those
rules in part or completely, sometimes with a focus on tax laws, sometimes with a
focus on election laws, and sometimes with a focus on state nonprofit laws. However,
what is needed is a comprehensive approach that considers the various ways
nonprofits can be involved in politics, the positive as well as negative effects of such
involvement, and the interaction between these different bodies of law at both the
federal and state level that relate to such involvement.
This Article takes such a comprehensive approach. Drawing on the now
extensive information regarding nonprofit political involvement, and where such
involvement appears to have repeatedly violated the existing legal rules, this Article
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. I am very grateful for comments on earlier versions of
this Article from Ellen Aprill, Roger Colinvaux, Nina J. Crimm, Leandra Lederman, Justin Levitt, Patricia
O’Hara, Marcus Owens, and participants at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, the
ARNOVA Annual Conference, the Chicago-Kent Faculty Workshop Series, the Indiana University Maurer
Schol of Law Tax Policy Colloquium, the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, the Loyola Tax
Policy Colloquium, the Notre Dame Faculty Colloquium, and the Valparasiso Law Review Symposium. I am
also very grateful for research assistance from Erik Adams, Kyle Chen, and Dehmeh Smith.
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will first provide a roadmap of such involvement, and the points where political
pressures are overwhelming the existing legal rules and the agencies charged with
enforcing them. Next, this Article will describe the various solutions proposed by
commentators, highlighting the incomplete nature of those solutions but also the
insights they provide regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the various legal
approaches for addressing such involvement. These insights include those relating
to the historical reasons for why the legal rules have developed in the manner they
have, as well as ones relating to the relative institutional competencies of the
agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing those rules.
Finally, this Article will propose an overall approach to modifying the existing
legal rules that relieves the identified pressure points without compromising the
important public policies underlying the current legal rules, including ensuring the
continuing ability of nonprofits to contribute to political debates in the United States.
This approach involves revising the federal tax rules for tax-exempt nonprofits to
clarify what constitutes prohibited political activity for charities, to loosen the
unnecessary (from a tax policy perspective) restrictions on political activity by noncharitable, tax-exempt nonprofits, and, most controversially, to permit churches and
other houses of worship to engage in political activity in the context of internal, inperson communications to members. It also involves shifting public disclosure rules
relating to political activity from federal tax law to federal and state election law,
refocusing such public disclosure on a broader range of such activity, and increasing
the donation amounts that trigger such disclosure with respect to donor identities.
This comprehensive approach recognizes the importance of maintaining the
current tax policy of not subsidizing efforts to support or oppose candidates for
elected office, while at the same time not unduly burdening the free speech, free
association, and free exercise of religion rights of individuals who collectively
engage in political activity through nonprofits. It also recognizes the institutional
limitations of the Internal Revenue Service when it comes to enforcing tax rules
relating to political activity, particularly given the breakneck pace of electoral
politics, by placing greater emphasis on the federal and state laws, and their related
agencies that specifically regulate elections. By doing so, this approach recognizes
and anticipates the dynamic nature of political involvement by nonprofits and so
seeks not to prohibit, but instead to channel that involvement in a manner that
furthers overall democratic participation goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Nonprofit organizations have a long history of involvement in politics in the
United States, including the role of churches in the American Revolution, the
abolitionist movement of the nineteenth century, and the civil rights movement of the
twentieth century.1 This is not to mention the role of other charitable organizations
in the latter two movements, the role of unions in the New Deal era, and the role of
1 See generally Steven Rathgeb Smith & Kirsten A. Grønbjerg, Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 221, 222, 229–33 (Walter W. Powell &
Richard Steinberg eds., 2006).
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business associations in modern times.2 While much of this involvement has related
to general public policy concerns or lobbying with respect to specific legislative
proposals, it has also often involved seeking to influence those elected to public
office.3 Yet it is only in the past twenty or so years that the latter involvement has
become not only particularly prominent, but also has pushed against and, in a growing
number of instances, broken through the applicable legal limits. The dangers flowing
from this trend are two-fold. First, it may damage the reputation of the nonprofit
sector and particularly the charitable part of that sector in the eyes of the public, as
well as undermine respect for the rule of law generally. Second, it may generate an
over-reaction that would not only reign in problematic behavior, but also generate
new laws that would unnecessarily restrict the ability of nonprofits and their members
to contribute to political discussions.
The story of nonprofit political proliferation is a complicated one involving the
interaction of federal tax law, federal and state election laws, court decisions relating
to both sets of laws, and broader political developments. The first part of this Article
addresses those laws, decisions, and developments, as well as the most prominent
areas of apparent illegal activity. This trend has also generated many proposals from
commentators ranging from sharply increasing the regulation of such political
activity by nonprofits to eliminating the now oft-ignored legal limitations. The
second part of this Article considers those proposals, the insights they provide into
the relevant legal, institutional, and political landscape, and the flaws they contain
that often flow from these proposals’ piecemeal approach to addressing this trend.
The third and final part of this Article provides a comprehensive approach for
addressing the increasingly “Wild West” nature of nonprofit political activities in a
way that furthers the legitimate public policy objectives of the existing restrictions
without unduly hindering the important and indeed constitutionally protected role of
nonprofits in politics. It does so by recognizing the distinct purposes and related
institutional competencies associated with federal tax law, federal and state election
law, and state charitable nonprofit law, and the need to alter those laws to reflect
those purposes and competencies as opposed to working against them. The results
are rules designed not to prohibit political involvement by all nonprofits, but instead
to use federal tax law to channel such involvement appropriately, given the longstanding and justifiable congressional tax policy decision to not subsidize such
activity while consolidating modified public disclosure requirements relating to such
activity in election law.
I. NONPROFITS AND POLITICS
When nonprofits engage in political activity, defined for the purpose of this
Article as activity relating to supporting or opposing the election of candidates to
public office, they are subject to a complex web of laws at both the federal and
2 Id.
3 See generally Roger Colinvaux, Policing the Border: A History of IRS Regulation of Political Activity,
HISTPHIL (Aug. 24, 2018), https://histphil.org/2018/08/24/policing-the-border-a-history-of-irs-regulation-ofpolitical-activity/; Roger Colinvaux, Nonprofits and Advocacy, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 185 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2017).
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state level with a long and detailed history. This history in turn has resulted in a
number of significant developments with respect to such engagement by nonprofits,
some of which are legal but troubling for policy reasons and some of which clearly
violate existing laws. This part first considers the relevant laws, and then considers
what they have led to in terms of actual political activity by nonprofits in recent years.
A. THE LAW
While nonprofit organizations are formed under state law—with their
“nonprofit” nature arising from their lack of owners with a legal right to any profits
they realize4—the most important nonprofit-specific body of law to them in most
instances is not state law but federal tax law. This is because almost all nonprofits
seek exemption from federal income taxes, given the broad range of organizations
eligible for such exemption. In doing so, nonprofits subject themselves to the
conditions Congress has imposed on such exemption, including with respect to
political activity.5 While many nonprofits may also seek exemption from various
state and local taxes, those latter exemptions are often dependent on federal
exemption and generally do not include conditions relating to political activity.6 But
for nonprofits engaging in political activity, election law at both the federal and state
levels is relevant, and recently there have been increasing efforts to alter state
nonprofit law to aid in efforts to regulate such political activity.7 Therefore, this
section considers these three bodies of law.
1. TAX LAW
As others have detailed, from the beginnings of the federal income tax, most
nonprofits have enjoyed federal tax exemption.8 The exemption from various state
taxes, particularly for charitable nonprofits, has an even longer history.9 Express
conditions relating to political activity are a somewhat later development at the
federal level, although that may be in part because many people considered those
conditions to be implicit, at least with respect to charitable nonprofits. Such
conditions generally do not exist at the state level.
More specifically, in 1934 Congress imposed a limitation on lobbying by

4 See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 56–57 (1981).
5 See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE
LAW AND REGULATION 238–41 (2004); John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 268–69 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
6 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 5, at 368–70.
7 See, e.g., Andrew M. Harris, Koch Linked Group Must Reveal Major Donors to California, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2018, 12:10 PM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-11/koch-brotherspac-must-reveal-major-donors-to-california.
8 See, e.g., John P. Persons et al., Criteria for Exemption under Section 501(c)(3), in IV RESEARCH
PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 1909, 1924–25
(1977); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 5.
9 See Persons et al., supra note 8, at 1923–24.
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charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits.10 In addition to being tax-exempt by virtue of
being described in what is now Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3), these charities
also enjoyed a number of other federal tax benefits, the most well-known of which is
the ability to receive charitable contributions that may be tax deductible to the donors.
This lobbying limitation was foreshadowed by both Treasury regulations and case
law.11 Congress later created an optional system for imposing this limitation that
provided greater clarity regarding what constituted lobbying and how much lobbying
is permitted for charities that elect into this system.12
In 1954, Congress imposed a prohibition on political activities by § 501(c)(3)
organizations that supported candidates for elected public office by enacting an
amendment proposed by then Senator Lyndon Johnson.13 While that provision has
recently come to be known as the “Johnson Amendment”14 and portrayed as driven
solely by the political concerns of Senator Johnson,15 it in fact arose after significant
congressional consideration and also grew from the earlier assumption that such a
prohibition was implicitly part of being “charitable.”16 Congress later amended this
prohibition to clarify that it also applied to opposing candidates and to the publication
or distribution of statements relating to candidates.17
10 Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 23(o), 48 Stat. 680, 690 (1934); see also id. §§ 101(6),
406, 517, at 700, 755, 760 (including the same restriction on a charity’s tax exemption and eligibility to receive
contributions exempted from the estate and gift taxes); Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, § 102(c), 49
Stat. 1014, 1016 (1935) (incorporating the same requirement into the charitable contribution deduction provision for corporations); I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2018) (current law).
11 See Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930); T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 285 (1919).
12 See I.R.C. §§ 501(h) (providing for this election), 4911(c)(2) (providing a sliding scale, beginning at
20%, for permitted lobbying expenditures) (2018).
13 See I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 501(c)(3) (2018).
14 See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (originally introduced as H.R.
8300); 100 CONG. REC. 9602, 9604 (1954) (agreeing to Senator Johnson’s proposal to include the prohibition
as an amendment to H.R. 8300).
15 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Politics by
Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 23–29
(2003) (explaining Senator Johnson’s political motivations behind introducing the 1954 amendment to §
501(c)(3)); Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable IRS
Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733, 759–65 (2001) (detailing how the IRS’s apparent inability to penalize a charity that had engaged in political activity opposing then Senator Lyndon Johnson’s re-election campaign led, in part, to Senator Johnson’s introduction of the amendment codifying the prohibition in § 501(c)(3)). But see Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, in INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY2002, at 335, 447–51 (2001), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf (discussing
speculation as to why Senator Johnson introduced the amendment and concluding that it is impossible to be
sure of his actual motivation).
16 See Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d at 185 (upholding the denial of deductible contributions under the predecessor to § 170(c)(2)); 9 JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34:05, at 22 (rev.
vol. 1983) (“[The 1954 codification] merely expressly stated what had always been understood to be the law.
Political campaigns did not fit within any of the specified purposes listed in the section.”); Ann M. Murphy,
Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate—Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 35, 54, 62 (2003)
(arguing that the prohibition arose from a longstanding suspicion of political activities by charities that was
strengthened by the McCarthy paranoia of the time, not primarily because of Senator Johnson’s desire to stop
his political opponents). For a nuanced consideration of the different explanations for the amendment, see
NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST
AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 111–16 (2011).
17 See Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10711(a), 101 Stat. 382, 464 (codified as
amended I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 501(c)(3), 2055(a)(2)–(3), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii), 2522(a)(2), 2522(b)(2)–
(3)); H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1621 (1987); H.R. REP. NO. 100-495, at 1018 (1987).
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For non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits, the rules vary. For many types of
such nonprofits, regulations and other guidance provide that they may engage in
unlimited lobbying as long as the lobbying furthers their exempt purposes and may
also engage in political activity as long as their other activity (including lobbying)
that furthers their exempt purposes remains their primary activity.18 Nonprofits
covered by these rules include social welfare organizations that are tax-exempt under
Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(4), unions that are tax-exempt under § 501(c)(5),
and trade associations that are tax-exempt under § 501(c)(6).19 Such nonprofits are
not eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions. Donors to such
nonprofits are, however, sometimes able to deduct their contributions as business
expenses, but Congress has provided that, to the extent such organizations spend
money on political activity (or lobbying), the organizations must either notify their
donors that the relevant proportion of their contributions are not deductible or pay
tax on the amounts so spent (thereby offsetting the cost to the Treasury of such a
deduction); these provisions are commonly referred to as a notice/proxy tax
requirement.20 For some other types of non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits, it
appears that no political activity is permitted, because their activities must be
exclusively dedicated to their particular exempt purposes and political activities are
not consistent with that requirement; an example of this type of nonprofit is §
501(c)(13) cemetery companies.21
Two other types of tax-exempt nonprofits are worth mentioning because of the
unique rules that apply to them. Congress enacted § 527 to clarify that political
organizations—including, but not limited to, candidate committees and political
parties—are exempt from tax on funds they receive that are dedicated to their
“exempt function.”22 This function includes both supporting or opposing the election
of candidates and supporting or opposing the selection, nomination, or appointment
of any individual to a public office.23 Such “527” organizations are not exempt from
tax on other income, such as investment income.24 They also are not eligible to
receive tax-deductible contributions. In 2000, after it became clear that not all 527s
were subject to election law disclosure rules, Congress modified § 527 to require such
organizations to file detailed, publicly available reports—including with respect to
the identities of significant donors—that mirrored the kinds of reports required by

18 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34, 233 (Dec. 30, 1969) (reviewing the shifting positions of the IRS and
the IRS Chief Counsel’s office before ultimately reaching this conclusion); T.D. 6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, 145–
46 (explaining that comments had been considered and reaching the conclusion that social welfare organizations
under § 501(c)(4) were tax-exempt as long as they were not primarily engaged in political activity).
19 See John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities of IRC
501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY 2003, at L-1 to L-3 (2002), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf.
20 See I.R.C. §§ 162(e)(3), 6033(e) (2018); Reilly & Allen, supra note 19, at L-20.
21 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(13) (2018); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(13)–1(b) (2018).
22 See Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10, 88 Stat. 2108, 2116–19 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 527 (2018)); S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 30 (1974); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1502, at 108 (1974); William P.
Streng, The Federal Tax Treatment of Political Contributions and Political Organizations, 29 TAX LAW. 139,
140 (1975).
23 Id.
24 See I.R.C. § 527(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (e)(1)–(2), (f) (2018).
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political committees under federal selection law.25 While almost all tax-exempt
nonprofits other than churches and church-related entities must file publicly available
annual returns, with the exception of a subset of charities known as private
foundations, any required reporting of donors’ identities is not subject to public
disclosure.26 In fact, the Treasury Department recently ended the requirement that
non-charitable, tax-exempt organizations disclose even to the IRS the identities of
their significant donors (although the statutory requirement that all charities disclose
their significant donors to the IRS remains in place).27 Finally, § 501(c)(19) veterans
organizations are both eligible to receive tax deductible charitable contributions and
are not subject to any limitations on political activity (or lobbying), except that such
activity must further their veterans-related exempt purposes.28
These provisions are consistent with the general policy that amounts spent on
political activity are not deductible for federal income tax purposes (with the
exception of the rules for § 501(c)(19) veterans organizations).29 So if an individual
or taxable, for-profit business makes a contribution to a charity (that therefore may
qualify as a tax deductible charitable contribution), that amount cannot be spent on
political activity because of the prohibition on political activity applicable to
charities. Similarly, if an individual or taxable business makes a contribution to a
non-charitable nonprofit that might be deductible to the individual or business as a
business expense, the notice/proxy tax requirement essentially eliminates that
deduction. This policy reflects a decision by Congress that such expenses should not
be deductible, even if they arguably further a charitable or business purpose. The
reasons for this policy are not completely clear, but it appears that Congress views
permitting a deduction for political activity as subsidizing that activity, and that such
a subsidy (to the detriment of the Treasury and so other taxpayers) is not warranted.30
Despite attempts to challenge this policy on constitutional grounds—both
general and specific (pertaining to charitable, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations)—
all of these attempts have failed. In 1959, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge on
First Amendment grounds to Congress’ decision to deny a business expense
deduction for lobbying expenses even when those expenses were closely related to
25 See Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.);
Disclosure of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 4 (2000) (statement of Rep. Amo Houghton, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight of H. Comm. on Ways & Means); David S. Karp, Note, Taxing Issues: Reexamining the
Regulation of Issue Advocacy by Tax-Exempt Organizations Through the Internal Revenue Code, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1805, 1828–29 (2002); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 625, 646 n.103; Michael Trister, The Rise and Reform of Stealth PACs, THE AM. PROSPECT, (Dec. 19,
2001), http://prospect.org/article/rise-and-reform-stealth-pacs (“During the last week of June [2000] . . . the
House and Senate abruptly acted to close the newest loophole in the federal election laws.”). As later amended,
there are exceptions for 527s that already provide similar disclosures under federal or state election law. See
I.R.C. § 527(j)(5) (2018).
26 See I.R.C. § 6104(b), (d)(1), (3)(A) (2018).
27 See Rev. Proc. 2018-38, 2018–31 I.R.B. 280.
28 See I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (c)(3), 501(c)(19) (2018).
29 See I.R.C. § 162(e) (2000). See generally Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on Section
527 Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773 (2007) (providing a detailed description of this rule). The Treasury Department issued the first version of this rule in 1915. See T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 57–58
(1915).
30 See infra section III.A.1.
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the business of the taxpayer.31 The Court concluded that such a deduction would be
a subsidy that Congress was not constitutionally required to provide. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court noted that businesses involved remained free to engage in the
speech at issue; they just would not receive the benefit of a tax deduction when doing
so.32 The same reasoning presumably would apply to the denial of a deduction for
political activity by a business. In 1983, the Supreme Court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to Congress’ decision to limit lobbying by charitable, taxexempt organizations, relying on the same reasoning.33 Again, the same reasoning
presumably would apply to the prohibition on political activity by charitable, taxexempt organizations.34 In fact, in 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reached this conclusion in rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to the prohibition by a church.35 The 527 disclosure provisions survived a
challenge on essentially the same grounds, with the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit concluding that to avoid these requirements, an organization only had to forgo
claiming tax-exempt status under § 527.36
2. ELECTION LAW
While federal law has, in theory, limited the flow of funds relating to the election
of candidates to federal office for more than a century, in reality, those limits were
largely ineffective before post-Watergate amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA).37 Congress initially tried to limit both contributions to
candidates, political parties, and political committees (entities with a “major purpose”
of influencing federal elections),38 and expenditures by candidates, political parties,
political committees, and individuals relating to federal elections. In the landmark
1976 case Buckley v. Valeo, however, the Supreme Court struck down limits on
expenditures as unconstitutional under the First Amendment, while leaving limits on
31 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512–13 (1959).
32 Id. at 533.
33 See generally Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); see also FCC v.
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 399–400 (1984).
34 See, e.g., Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin Right
to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 929
(2011); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10
ELECTION L.J. 407, 423–24 (2011).
35 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
36 Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1361–62 (11th Cir. 2003).
37 See ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW (1988).
38 More specifically, the definition of a political committee under FECA, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Buckley, is an organization that is either under the control of a candidate or has a “major purpose” to
nominate or elect a (federal) candidate, and which either receives $1000 in contributions or makes $1000 in
expenditures during a single calendar year. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4) (2018); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
see also Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1000, 1004 (2005) (describing the Buckley Court’s “redefinition of political committee”). This definition
is narrower than it first appears because the FEC, in the wake of Buckley, interpreted “expenditures” in this
context as being limited to expenditures for campaign contributions and express advocacy; the FEC applied this
limited definition both to the $1000 threshold and the major purpose test, making that test whether the major
purpose of the committee is to make campaign contributions and/or engage in express advocacy. See Richard
Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 957–58 (2005).
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contributions in place.39 While it is often criticized and also blamed for creating a
dialing-for-dollars culture for candidates—because they can spend unlimited
amounts, but can only raise a limited amount of funds from any given donor—the
basic Buckley framework remains in place today.40
That said, there have been several significant developments within that
framework in the intervening decades, three of which are worth noting. First,
political parties eventually developed a way of mostly avoiding the contribution
limits to which they were subject, only to have Congress end that work around in
2002 with the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).41 The
Supreme Court upheld this portion of BCRA in 2003, and it has survived challenge
since then.42 Second, another provision of BCRA made a knowing violation of any
federal campaign finance laws a felony subject to a sentence of up to ten years, which
significantly raised the stakes for individuals who violate these laws.43 Third, the
Supreme Court initially upheld the pre-1970s prohibition on the ability of
corporations to spend treasury funds on certain communications and other activities
relating to the election of candidates to federal office.44 But in 2010, the Supreme
Court overrode that decision in Citizens United v. FEC with respect to
communications not coordinated with candidates or political parties.45 While
Citizens United did not explicitly address a similar prohibition on union spending, it
is generally assumed that its reasoning also applies to that prohibition.46
With respect to disclosure, the Supreme Court has consistently held the federal
government may require public disclosure of even relatively modest contributors to
(and recipients of expenditures by) candidate committees, political parties, political
committees, and other groups that make certain election-related communications.47
39 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
40 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 393–485 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by three other Justices) (criticizing Buckley); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 235–94 (partial
dissents by five Justices); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV.
581 (2011); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
41 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 101, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 82–86 (now codified
at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101, 30125 (2018)).
42 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
43 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 312, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 106 (now codified at 52
U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A) (2018)).
44 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
45 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
46 See, e.g., Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2012); In re: Anh Cao
v. FEC, 619 F.3d 410, 422–23 (5th Cir. 2010).
47 See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 197–202 (2010); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67; Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65–68 (1976); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 400 (2011); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact
of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 221 (2010); Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History
of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 389 (2013); Katherine Shaw, Reorienting Disclosure Debates in a PostCitizens United World, in DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA
153, 154–58 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018); see also Delaware Strong Families v.
Att’y Gen., 703 F.3d 304, 309–13 (3d Cir. 2015) (state election law requiring public disclosure of
significant donors to entities that en-gaged in certain election-related communications found to be
constitutional). Some recent commentators have cautioned that the constitutional law relating to disclosure
needs significantly more development, however. See Jessica Levinson, Full Disclosure: The Next Frontier
in Campaign Finance Law, 93 DEN. L. REV. 431 (2016); Katherine Shaw, Taking Disclosure Seriously,
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA (Apr. 3, 2016, 4:30 PM), http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/taking-disclosureseriously.
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Current federal election law imposes such public disclosure requirements.48 For
disclosure purposes, covered election-related communications include (a) “express
advocacy”, messages that explicitly tell the listener or viewer to support or oppose a
clearly identified candidate,49 and (b) “electioneering communications”, broadcast,
cable, or satellite communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate, reach a
sufficient number of the relevant electorate, and are aired within a certain time
window before the relevant primary or general election.50
States are generally bound by the same constitutional restrictions as the federal
government, but the actual state election laws for political activity spending with
respect to state and local candidates varies significantly from state-to-state.51 Some
states have laws that mirror the federal laws, although often with lower contribution
limits. Other states permit activities prohibited under federal law, such as allowing
unlimited contributions to candidate committees, political parties, and political
committees by individuals and sometimes even by corporations and unions. All
states require some level of public disclosure of contributors’ identities and the
identities of expenditure recipients, however, the details vary.52
3. NONPROFIT LAW
For the most part, state laws governing nonprofit organizations—generally
nonprofit corporations, nonprofit unincorporated associations, and charitable trusts—
do not address political activity. Instead those laws tend to focus on organizational
and governance details of such entities.53 While, on occasion, a state agency has read
the federal tax rules relating to political activity into state nonprofit laws, state courts
have generally rejected such interpretations absent explicit statutory language.54
B. THE FACTS
There have always been some nonprofits that pushed against the legal restrictions
on political activity. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s the virulently antiCommunist ministry of Dr. Billy James Hargis sought to influence the election of
candidates to public office (as well as to influence legislation), eventually leading to
IRS revocation of its tax-exempt, charitable status.55 But until recently, documented
instances of political activity that violated the applicable federal tax laws have been
relatively sparse and indicated that the violations that did occur were usually minor
48 See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4), (b)(3)(A), (b)(5)(A) (2018).
49 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52 (1976). The specific disclosure requirements are provided
by 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c), (g) (2018).
50 See 52 U.S.C. § 30104 (2018).
51 See generally NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE WEBPAGES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/ncsl-s-campaign-finance-webpages.aspx (last visited
Oct. 30, 2018).
52 See generally id.
53 See generally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 5.
54 See, e.g., Holy Spirit Ass’n v. Tax Comm’n, 435 N.E.2d 662, 667–68 (N.Y. 1982) (rejecting an attempt
to read into state law the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) limitations on lobbying and political activity).
55 See Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
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and inadvertent.56 There is evidence that this has significantly changed in recent
years, however.
1. “DARK MONEY” AND UNDERREPORTING
The first extensively reported use of tax-exempt nonprofits for political activity
did not actually violate any tax laws, but did create pressures that influenced both
later behavior and legal developments. In the 1990s, political actors realized that the
tax-exempt “political organizations” category—that is, Internal Revenue Code §
527—was defined broadly enough that it included not only entities subject to federal
and state election law public disclosure requirements, but also other politically active
organizations, even if they avoided the types of communications that triggered such
requirements.57 These “stealth PACs,” as one critic labelled them, therefore had the
ability to operate without any public disclosures of either their contributors or their
expenditures, escaping all reporting obligations to either election agencies or tax
agencies.58 The former was because of the First Amendment driven limitations on
the reach of federal and state election laws (as exemplified by the limited scope of
election-related communications covered by election law59), and the latter was
because Congress apparently did not realize when it enacted § 527 that there could
be 527s that were not subject to election law disclosure requirements.60
The influence of these organizations arguably peaked in the 2000 primary
elections, when 527 organization Republicans for Clean Air funded ads that
undermined the candidacy of Senator John McCain for the Republican presidential
nomination without having to reveal its sources of funding. Only after Senator
McCain lost several critical primary elections did it become known that the group
had been funded by a couple of staunch supporters of then-Governor George W.
Bush.61 Senator McCain, a long-time supporter of strong campaign finance laws,
then pushed through a modification of § 527 to require all 527s to file detailed public
disclosure reports with the IRS, as detailed previously.62
56 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on Political Activity by Charities, 6
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 7–17 (2007).
57 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996) (concluding that an organization qualified for
tax-exempt status under § 527 even though it designed its election-related activities specifically to avoid falling
within the reach of federal or state election laws); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24, 1997) (same); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 21, 1997) (same). See generally Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section
527 To Design a New Campaign Finance Vehicle, 86 TAX NOTES 387 (reviewing these rulings).
58 See COMMON CAUSE, UNDER THE RADAR: THE ATTACK OF THE “STEALTH PACS” ON OUR NATION’S
ELECTIONS (2000) (on file with author).
59 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
60 See Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 To Design a New Campaign Finance Vehicle,
86 TAX NOTES 387, 390 & n.20 (2000) (“there appears to have been at least an implicit assumption that section
527 organizations would be subject to the FECA,” but also acknowledging that “[l]ittle thought was given to
the relation between section 527 and the new FECA”).
61 See David Folkenflik, Political Donors Find New Loophole: Tax-Exempt Groups Can Spend Unlimited Sums, Hide the Givers, BALT. SUN, at 1A (Apr. 24, 2000) (describing activities of various 527s in the 2000
elections, including Republicans for Clean Air).
62 See 146 CONG. REC. S4607, 4656–58 (daily ed. June 7, 2000) (statement of Sen. McCain) (offering
527 disclosure provisions as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S.
2549, 106th Cong. (2000)). The amendment almost certainly would have been fatal to the bill because the
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This change had an apparently unintended consequence, however. Donors
seeking to be anonymous, and groups seeking to avoid detailed public disclosure of
their contributors and expenditures, did not abandon political activity. Instead, they
shifted that activity to non-charitable, tax-exempt organizations, such as § 501(c)(4)
social welfare organizations and § 501(c)(6) trade associations. This shift was
facilitated by the relatively vague definition of political activity for federal tax
purposes, as well as the relatively vague limit on how much political activity such
groups could engage in.63 The money that flowed in and out of such groups is now
labelled “dark money” by critics, since generally the ultimate sources of their funds
are not subject to public disclosure under either election law or tax law. While still
a relatively small proportion of total spending on elections, because of the ability of
these groups to concentrate their spending on relatively few races, in critical races
their spending can have a disproportionate effect.64
Many critics have attempted to change laws at both the federal and state level to
expose the sources of these funds, but they generally have only had limited success.
For example, federal disclosure legislation has failed to advance in Congress.65 Only
a few states have enacted relatively comprehensive disclosure requirements under
their election laws applicable to groups engaged in political activity within their
boundaries, although these requirements have withstood constitutional challenge
under the Supreme Court precedents mentioned previously.66 A few states have also
sought access to schedules of donors submitted by tax-exempt organizations to the
IRS under their charitable nonprofit laws that are usually broad enough to encompass
§ 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations as well as § 501(c)(3) charities.67 Such
attempts have, to date, also generally survived constitutional challenge. These efforts

Constitution requires that revenue-generating provisions originate in the House. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The
Senate’s addition of a tax provision to the reauthorization bill would therefore have exposed that bill to being
“blue-slipped” as a revenue bill that failed to meet this constitutional requirement, which gave supporters of the
amendment leverage to push for a floor consideration of the proposal that led to its enactment. See 146 CONG.
REC. S4721, 4785 (daily ed. June 8, 2000) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (calling attention to the risk that this
amendment posed to the bill).
63 See Ellen P. Aprill, The Section 527 Obstacle to Effective Section 501(c)(4) Regulations, 13 PITT. TAX
REV. 43, 76–78 (2015) (limits of tax law disclosure requirements); Kristy Eagan, Note, Dark Money Rises:
Federal and State Attempts to Rein in Undisclosed Campaign-Related Spending, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801,
825–29 (2012) (limits of election law disclosure requirements).
64 See CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., NON-PARTY INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN HOUSE AND SENATE ELECTIONS, 1978-2016, http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/vital/VitalStats_t14.pdf (independent expenditures reported for
congressional elections); Outside Spending, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last visited Feb, 7, 2018) (non-candidate, non-political party political spending reported for federal elections); Michael M. Franz, Interest Groups in Electoral Politics: 2012 in Context, 10 THE FORUM: J.
APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 62, 62 (2013); Chisun Lee et al., Secret Spending in the States, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (2016) (spending in state elections by groups for which the original sources of funds were either not
disclosed or were difficult to identify); Michael J. Malbin et al., Independent Spending in State Elections, 20062016 (Campaign Fin. Inst., Working Paper, 2017) http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/Malbin-etal_APSA2018_Paper_IE-State-2006-2016_working-paper.pdf (political spending done independently of candidates in the states for which data are available).
65 See, e.g., For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 4100-4801 (2019); Democracy is
Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act of 2018, H.R. 6239, 115th Cong. (2018); Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act of 2017, S. 1585, 115th Cong. (2017).
66 See, e.g., Delaware Strong Families v. Att’y Gen., 703 F.3d 304, 309–13 (3d Cir. 2015).
67 See, e.g., Am. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2018).
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may have more limited effect in the future, however, because of the federal
government’s decision to forgo this schedule for non-501(c)(3)s for taxable years
ending on or after December 31, 2018.68 So, at least for now, funds from undisclosed
sources that are used for political activity continue to flow through non-charitable,
non-527 tax-exempt nonprofits in most states.
One other perhaps unintended consequence of these developments is that they
drew scrutiny to the amount of political activity spending reported by non-charitable,
non-527 tax-exempt nonprofits on the publicly available annual information returns
(Form 990 series) that they file with the IRS. This scrutiny applied to both longexisting such organizations, as well as newly created ones, and in at least a number
of instances revealed apparent significant underreporting of such spending.69 Critics
have also maintained that a number of the organizations have pushed against or even
through the requirement that political activity remain a “secondary” activity for them,
while concealing the fact they were doing so through aggressive underreporting of
their political activity spending.70 Not all such organizations have engaged in such
deceptive reporting, of course, but even for admitted 527s, it is unclear how accurate
their filings and disclosures to the IRS have been.71 Unlike the duties of the FEC and
its state counterparts with respect to election law required disclosures, policing the
accuracy and completeness of such disclosures is a very small part of the IRS’
responsibilities. This may be why the IRS appears to have done very little policing
in this area, including with respect to criminal referrals for blatant violations of
disclosure obligations.72
Nevertheless, the combination of money flowing through non-charitable, taxexempt nonprofits for political activity and the vague, but real, limit on how much
those nonprofits are allowed to spend on such activity—all while maintaining their
68 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Limits and Opportunities for NonProfit Groups in Federal Elections, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 281–82 (2004) (commenting on the apparent paucity
of IRS enforcement actions and minimal penalties for tax-exempt organization reporting failures); Stephen R.
Weissman & Kara D. Ryan, Nonprofit Interest Groups’ Election Activities and Federal Campaign Finance
Policy, 54 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 21, 26–27 (2006) (reporting that of the non-527 tax-exempt organizations
studied, some were failing to report some or all of their political activity in part because of inadequate IRS
oversight).
70 See, e.g., Donald B. Tobin, The Internal Revenue Service and a Crisis of Confidence: A New Regulatory Approach for a New Era, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 429, 458–60, 466–67 (2014); Lee Fang, Five 501(c)(4) Groups
That Might Have Broken the Law, THE NATION (May 21, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/five-501c4groups-might-have-broken-law/.
71 See PUB. CITIZEN, OFF TO THE RACES: FIRST QUARTER REPORTS SHOW THAT 50 TOP “527” ORGANIZATIONS COLLECTED ALMOST $11 MILLION IN SOFT MONEY; DISCLOSURE PROBLEMS CONTINUE 4-6 (2002),
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/1stq2002_527report.pdf (reporting on problems with the IRS’s website for tracking 527 organizations); INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 2005-10-125, ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE SECTION 527 POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS PUBLICLY DISCLOSE THEIR ACTIVITIES TIMELY AND COMPLETELY 5-6 (2005) (concluding, based on a statistically valid sample of the 527
filings and without independently verifying any of the submitted information, that 7% of 527s failed to file a
timely initial report, 13% failed to file one or more required periodic reports, and of those that did file the
required period reports, 22% did not include all of the required information); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, NO. GAO-02-444, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: DATA DISCLOSURE AND IRS’S OVERSIGHT OF ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE IMPROVED 8-14 (2002) (detailing concerns about difficulties with using the IRS website
and flaws with planned IRS efforts to address these concerns).
72 See Tobin, supra note 70, at 459, 460.
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tax-exempt status—created political pressure to scrutinize the claimed tax status of
such groups. This pressure existed in part because there was an argument that if such
a group failed to qualify under § 501(c) for tax exemption, they would be subject to
§ 527 and its public disclosure requirements, perhaps even retroactively. One
apparent consequence of this pressure was an IRS attempt to carefully scrutinize new
groups voluntarily seeking IRS recognition of such tax exemption for excessive
political activity, an attempt that resulted in the well-known “Tea Party scandal” that
cost several IRS officials their careers and made the IRS the target of ferocious
congressional criticism for a number of years.73 While the election of President
Donald J. Trump and the subsequent resolution of all of the lawsuits arising out of
the Tea Party controversy appears to have ended that scandal, the IRS is likely to be
wary of strongly policing the tax rules relating to political activity for many years to
come as a result.
2. FLY-BY-NIGHT ORGANIZATIONS
One result of the federal tax laws and their related enforcement procedures is a
long delay between individuals or organizations engaging in illegal behavior and the
investigation and punishment of such behavior. While there are exceptions—notably
for newly emerging, lucrative tax evasion schemes, to which the IRS sometimes
responds with quickly issued notices,74 and also during the 2008-2009 financial
crisis75—for the most part, the IRS can afford this relatively slow pace of
enforcement because, at the end of the day, it is all about money. That means that to
the extent a taxpayer owes the federal government money, the delay means that an
appropriate amount of interest must be added to the amount owed to make the federal
government whole.
This slow approach to enforcement applies with respect to tax-exempt
organizations in several ways. First, while most organizations claiming tax
exemption under § 501(c)(3) (and so also the related ability to receive tax deductible
charitable organizations) are required to file an application for recognition of that
status with the IRS, that application is not due until twenty-seven months after the
formation of the organization.76 While Congress recently required newly formed §
501(c)(4) social welfare organizations to notify the IRS of their existence within sixty
days of formation, only a relatively small amount of information is required on that
notice (and the notice is not an application for recognition of exemption, which is a
73 See S. REP. NO. 114-119 (2015) (report on the Tea Party controversy); Philip Hackney, Should the IRS
Never “Target” Taxpayers? An Examination of the IRS Tea Party Affair, 49 VAL. L. REV. 453, 478–80 (2015)
(describing this controversy); Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative Discretion, 42
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 41, 42–44, 49–51 (2013) (same); George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by
Respecting the Public’s Right to Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2014) (same); Paul Caron, The IRS Scandal, TAXPROF BLOG, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/irs-scandal (last visited Oct. 30, 2018) (gathering
information regarding this controversy).
74 See Abusive Tax Shelters and Transactions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/abusive-tax-shelters-and-transactions (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
75 See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Crises and Tax, 67 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1174–1202 (2018).
76 See I.R.C. § 508 (2018); 26 C.F.R. § 1.508-1 (2018); IRS, APPLYING FOR 501(C)(3) TAX-EXEMPT
STATUS 9 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4220.pdf.
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separate, optional filing for such groups, so the notice does not trigger IRS review of
the organization’s qualification for tax exemption).77 Second, the publicly available
annual information return for tax-exempt organizations is not due until four-and-ahalf-months after the end of each fiscal year, and an automatic six-month extension
is available with the filing of a simple form.78 This means that if a new entity is
formed on the first day of the first month of its initial fiscal year, it can delay filing
its first annual information return until twenty-two and a-half months after formation.
These timeframes contrast sharply with the requirements imposed on entities
required to make public disclosures under federal and state election laws and, since
2000, the tax law disclosures required of 527s that are not subject to election law
disclosure requirements. Those other legal regimes require prompt notice to the
relevant agency of the formation of a new entity and detailed reporting of
contributions and expenditures, which reporting becomes more frequent and has
increasingly tight deadlines as elections approach.79 The purpose and effect of these
regimes is to provide the public with increasing information, including about sources
of financial support, as each election cycle approaches its finale.
One consequence of these timing differences is that it is possible to create “flyby-night” tax-exempt organizations that exist only for a single election cycle and then
disappear before any required IRS filings, much less IRS scrutiny. For example, the
Center for Responsive Politics documented the creation and then disappearance of a
cluster of § 501(c)(4) organizations involved in political activities.80 While such
organizations may—or may not—eventually make the required filings, by that point
the relevant elections are over, and as a result, any penalties short of imprisonment
are likely to be considered trivial by the individuals who create such groups.
Identifying such organizations is understandably difficult, but there have been reports
of a number classified both as non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits and as charities
in recent years.81 It is not known whether those reports capture most such entities, in
which case there appear to have been relatively few of them, or are only the tip of the
iceberg.
3. CHURCHES AND “PULPIT FREEDOM SUNDAY”
As mentioned in the introduction, churches have a long history of political
involvement in the United States. The enactment of the Johnson Amendment in
1954, while not targeted at churches, bars them along with other tax-exempt charities
from supporting or opposing candidates for elected public office as a condition of
that exemption and other benefits, such as the ability to receive tax deductible
77 See I.R.C. § 506 (2018); Electronically Submit Your Form 8976, Notice of Intent to Operate Under
Section 501(c)(4), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/electronically-submityour-form-8976-notice-of-intent-to-operate-under-section-501c4 (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
78 See I.R.C. § 6033 (2018); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6033-2, 1.6033-2T(e) (2018); Exempt Organization Annual
Filing Requirements Overview, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/exemptorganization-annual-filing-requirements-overview (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
79 See I.R.C. § 527(i), (j) (2018); 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4), (b)(3)(A), (b)(5)(A) (2018).
80 Robert Maguire & Viveca Novak, American Commitment’s Missing Millions, OPENSECRETS NEWS
(Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/04/american-commitments-missing-millions/.
81 See, e.g., id.
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charitable contributions, that come along with that status. Many churches and their
supporters have argued against this prohibition as both bad policy and an
unconstitutional restriction on their free exercise of religion, although many churches
and others have also supported the prohibition.82
While today the common perception is that it is white, evangelical Protestant
churches that are most likely to violate this prohibition, historically violators were
often predominantly African-American churches.83 This is understandable, given the
long-standing political role of such churches within black communities.84 The IRS
appears, however, to have mostly either been ignorant of, or to have turned a blind
eye to, such activity. This may be in part because most violations—whether at
predominantly African-American churches or at churches of other denominations or
faiths—involved messages delivered during worship gatherings, so the religious
leader communicating support or opposition of a candidate or political party was
literally preaching to the choir (who were unlikely to report the violation to the IRS,
and who probably already knew and often agreed with the leader’s political views).
In the mid-2000s, the IRS launched a focused enforcement effort aimed at
prohibited political activity by charities, including churches. That effort identified
hundreds of violations over several years, including campaign contributions by some
charities (likely in states that permit corporate contributions to state and local
candidates). But almost all such violations appear to have been relatively minor and
probably inadvertent, at least based on the IRS’ decision to only issue warning letters
in the vast majority of cases.85 The relatively weak response by the IRS contrasts
with the potential criminal penalties that apply to violations of campaign finance
laws, penalties that the federal government appears to be more willing to apply than
any applicable criminal penalties relating to tax violations.86 Included among the
82 See, e.g., Letter from ACCES et al. to Charles Grassley, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm. & Richard
Neal, Chairman, House Ways & Means Comm. (Feb. 6, 2019) (opposing weakening or repealing the prohibition
on political activity by Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) organizations, including churches), https://interfaithalliance.org/cms/assets/uploads/2019/02/2019-02-06-Johnson-Amendment-Sign-On-Letter_FINAL.pdf.
83 See Greg Smith et al., Religious Groups React to the 2006 Election, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 27, 2006)
(reporting on candidate endorsements by clergy in two predominantly African-American denominations),
https://www.pewresearch.org/2006/11/27/religious-groups-react-to-the-2006-election/.
84 See Vaughn E. James, The African-American Church, Political Activity, and Tax Exemption, 37 SETON
HALL L. REV. 371, 391–96 (2007).
85 During the 2004 election year, the IRS initiated either examinations or, in the case of churches and
other houses of worship, inquiries of 132 organizations. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FINAL REPORT: PROJECT 302: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE 5, 20–21 (2005) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT],
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final_paci_report.pdf. This compares to the approximately 250,000 charities
that filed annual information returns for 2002; the IRS also estimates there are 500,000 additional charities that
are active but are not required to file such returns either because they are houses of worship and church-related
organizations or because they have a relatively low level of financial activity. Paul Arnsberger, Charities and
Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2003, in 26 STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 231(2006),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06fallbul.pdf. Of the eighty-two closed cases, no political activity was found in
eighteen cases, and fifty-six led to findings of minor or isolated incidences of political activity. Of the remaining
eight cases, five led to the filing of corrected or delinquent returns and three to proposed revocation. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., 2004 POLITICAL ACTIVITY COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (PACI) SUMMARY OF RESULTS (2006)
[hereinafter 2004 PACI SUMMARY], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/one_page_statistics.pdf.
86 See, e.g., Geoffrey Lou Guray, How Michael Cohen Broke Campaign Finance Law, PBS NEWS HOUR
(Dec. 12, 2018, 12:53 PM EST), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-michael-cohen-broke-campaign-
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violating charities were a number of churches, but in common with the other violating
charities almost all of the churches appear to have quietly accepted the IRS
warnings.87
In 2008, however, the legal organization now known as the Alliance Defending
Freedom (ADF) launched “Pulpit Freedom Sunday,” publicly calling on pastors to
deliver political messages from the pulpit that would then be communicated to the
IRS, with ADF promising to defend the church in any subsequent IRS examination.88
While initially involving only a few dozen congregations, the effort has now grown
to several thousand congregations each year, with no apparent IRS pushback.89 This
may be explained by a reluctance of the IRS to either engage on this politically
sensitive topic or to test in court the constitutionality of the Johnson Amendment
when applied to messages delivered by religious leaders during worship services (or
both). Interestingly, there also appears to be a reluctance on the part of ADF to bring
this issue to the courts, as ADF could force a court resolution by causing a new church
to be created and to file (voluntarily, since churches are exempt from the application
requirement) for § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status while revealing its plans to support or
oppose candidates from the pulpit. ADF could then bring a declaratory judgment
action on behalf of the church if the IRS rejected the application or refused to rule on
it.90 But regardless of the motivations on either side of this issue for not going to
court, the public campaign by ADF encouraging blatant violations of the prohibition
continues.91
4. THE NON-POLITICAL MAJORITY
Lastly, it should not be lost in this description that it appears that the vast majority
of tax-exempt nonprofits, both charitable and non-charitable, do not engage in
political activity and therefore do not violate the tax law limitations on such activity.
For example, even if several thousand churches are violating the Johnson
Amendment annually, they represent only approximately one percent of
congregations, and the proportion of the other million or so charities engaging in such
activity is likely even less.92 Similarly, while hundreds of 501(c)(4)s may be engaged
finance-law; Press Release, U.S. Atty’s Office, S.D.N.Y., Dinesh D’Souza Sentenced in Manhattan Federal
Court to Five Years of Probation for Campaign Finance Fraud (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/contactus/field-offices/newyork/news/press-releases/dinesh-dsouza-sentenced-in-manhattan-federal-court-to-fiveyears-of-probation-for-campaign-finance-fraud. See generally U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF
ELECTION OFFENSES (Richard C. Pilger et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download.
87 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 85, at 18–19; 2004 PACI SUMMARY, supra note 85.
88 See Suzanne Sataline et al., Partisan Sunday Sermons Test Federal Tax Laws, WALL ST. J., at A12,
Sept. 29, 2008.
89 See Eugene Scott, Pastors Take to Pulpit to Protest IRS Limits on Political Endorsements, CNN (Oct.
1, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/01/politics/pulpit-freedom-sunday-johnson-amendment/index.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018); Sataline et al., supra note 88.
90 See I.R.C. § 7428 (2018); Charitable Organizations Exemption Applications: Declaratory Judgments,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/charitableor-ganizations-exemption-applications-declaratory-judgments (updated Nov. 18, 2018); CRIMM & WINER,
supra note 16, at 85 n.83 (2011).
91 See Press Release, Alliance Defending Freedom, Additional Resources: Pulpit Initiative | Pulpit
Free-dom Sunday (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/4360.
92 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 DATA BOOK 57 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
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in political activity (most of which likely are complying with the primary activity
test), there are over 80,000 such organizations, most of which are focused on
activities well removed from political activity;93 even if there are a high proportion
of unions and trade associations engaged in political activity, given the extent of their
non-political activities it seems highly likely that most, perhaps almost all, of them
are also in compliance with the primary activity test.94 So from a tax perspective, the
above violations appear to involve a relatively small proportion of the tax-exempt
organization universe. That fact raises the issue of whether it is wise to change the
tax laws to better address such a relatively small group. Such violations receive
significant media and public attention, however, presumably both because of how
flagrant some of them are and because of the high-profile nature of political
involvement, and so can still have serious negative effects on the reputation of the
nonprofit sector and respect for the rule of law.
II. PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS NONPROFITS AND POLITICS
Given these recent developments and the increasingly polarized partisan
environment, many commentators have put forward proposals to address the three
pressures identified above: dark money and related underreporting of political
activity by tax-exempt nonprofits; fly-by-night nonprofits with short existences
designed to avoid meaningful IRS scrutiny; and highly visible political activity by a
significant number of churches in violation of the Johnson Amendment. While most
commentators are careful to acknowledge the multiple bodies of law involved with
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofits, the proposals tend to focus on a single body
of law and its related agency(ies): tax law and the IRS; election law and the FEC (and
its state counterparts); and nonprofit law and its state enforcement bodies. But while
a more comprehensive approach is desirable for reasons detailed in Part III of this
Article, looking at these more piecemeal proposals provides useful insights for
developing that approach.
A. FIXING TAX LAW AND THE IRS
There are essentially three sets of proposals related to fixing federal tax law to
address the above pressures. One set of proposals would weaken or eliminate the
Johnson Amendment, as illustrated by a series of legislative proposals in Congress
and statements from President Trump and others in his administration. A second set
of proposals would retain the existing limits on political activity but clarify what
constitutes political activity. A third set of proposals would modify the limit on
soi/17databk.pdf.
93 See Jeremy Koulish, There Are a Lot of 501(c)(4) Nonprofit Organizations. Most Are Not Political.,
URBAN WIRE: NONPROFITS & PHILANTHROPY (May 24, 2013), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/there-arelot-501c4-nonprofit-organizations-most-are-not-political.
94 See SOI Tax Stats - Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Organizations Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other-tax-exempt-organizations-statistics (under “501(c)(3) through 501(c)(9) Organizations: Form 990 –Balance Sheet and Income Statement Items” follow
“2015” hyperlink; then search field for “Total Expenses”)(reporting over $23 billion and over $43 billion in
such expenses for Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) organizations, respectively).
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political activity by charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits, although commentators differ
on whether to tighten or loosen that limit.95
1. CHANGING THE LIMIT FOR CHARITIES
The proposals that arguably have received the most attention are ones to either
significantly modify or remove the Johnson Amendment, whether only for churches
or for all charities. President Trump has repeatedly stated his intention to “destroy”
the Johnson Amendment, and others in his administration have stated that the IRS
will not enforce it (ignoring both its statutory origin and the protections the IRS
enjoys from political interference in specific examination decisions).96 Members of
Congress for many years have introduced bills to repeal or modify the Johnson
Amendment, and they renewed those efforts in the wake of the 2016 election
(although with no greater success, and with the results of the 2018 election such
efforts are even less likely to advance).97
The way these proposals have developed show the difficulty of this approach,
however. Even with the presidency and control of both chambers of Congress,
Republicans have been unable to coalesce around a single proposal, in part because
of the strident opposition to any change from not only many charities, but even many
churches.98 This opposition stems in part from fears that charities would quickly
become the political vehicle of choice given that they would combine relative
anonymity (unless subject to election law disclosure requirements) and, for those
donors who itemize, deductibility of contributions, a combination not otherwise
generally available.99 If that were to occur, it could lead to an acceleration in the
decline of the charitable sector’s public reputation, harming not only politically active
charities, but also the vast majority of charities that do not engage in political activity.
This may be why Republican leaders in Congress moved quickly away from
complete repeal of the Johnson Amendment to modifications of it, whether by
exempting presentations by religious institutions during religious services or by
allowing all charities—not just churches—to engage in political activity, but only to
the extent it was done in the ordinary course of their regular and customary activities

95 It should be noted that there have been numerous proposals over the years to improve the enforcement
capabilities of the IRS with respect to tax-exempt organizations more generally, but none of these proposals has
had any significant traction and they usually do not relate specifically to political activity, so I do not consider
them here. See generally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, “The Better Part of Valour is Discretion”: Should the IRS
Change or Surrender Its Oversight of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 80, 97–99 (2016).
96 See, e.g., Julie Zauzmer & Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Trump Wants to End the Johnson Amendment Today.
Here’s What You Need to Know, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-offaith/wp/2017/02/02/trump-said-hell-totally-destroy-the-johnson-amendment-what-is-it-and-why-do-peoplecare/.
97 See, e.g., Tom Gjelten, Another Effort to Get Rid of the “Johnson Amendment” Fails, NPR (Mar. 22,
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/22/596158332/another-effort-to-get-rid-of-the-johnson-amendment-fails.
98 See Letter from African American Ministers in Action et al. to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, et al., (Nov. 13, 2017) (106 religious and denominational organizations opposing weakening
or
eliminating
the
Johnson
amendment),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/568e979c40667a5cc6a4eaf1/t/5b05bdf7575d1f67cf96cb6e/1527102968
178/Faith+Org+Letter+106+signers.pdf.
99 See id. at 2.
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and if it only involved no more than de minimis incremental expenses.100 The
administrative difficulties such modifications create are obvious, however, and may
have contributed to the eventual decision by Republicans to remove any change from
the 2017 tax legislation.101 Whatever its flaws, one advantage of the Johnson
Amendment in its current form is it provides a bright line by prohibiting any political
activity by tax-exempt charities, although it leaves the definition of such activity
relatively vague. The next set of proposals attempt to address this latter issue.
2. CLARIFYING THE DEFINITION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Another set of proposals aim to clarify the definition of political activity.
Perhaps the most developed of these proposals with respect to the definition of
political activity is the Bright Lines project, which would refine the definition of
political activity for all types of tax-exempt nonprofits.102 The advantages of such
clarifications is that they reduce both the compliance burden on tax-exempt
organizations and the enforcement burden on the IRS, with the latter having the
additional advantage of lessening IRS discretion and so hopefully its vulnerability to
the partisan bias charges such as those leveled at the IRS during the Tea Party
controversy. Such clarifications could therefore also provide the IRS with enough
cover to go after misreporting by politically active nonprofits (since claims of
misunderstanding the rules would be more difficult to credibly make), fly-by-night
entities (although these clarifications do not address how to speed up enforcement
with respect to such entities), and politically active churches. At the same time, if
the definition of political activity is significantly narrowed, it might create the
situation already present under the election law where a lot of activity intended to,
and which in fact does, support or oppose candidates, escapes regulation because it
is outside the relatively narrow, although also relatively clear, definition of covered
communications and other activities. The proposals also do not address the dark
money issue more generally.
3. CHANGING THE LIMIT FOR NON-CHARITIES
Proposals relating to the amount of permitted political activity for non-charitable,
tax-exempt nonprofits range from completely eliminating any limitation to sharply
reducing the permitted amount.103 Such proposals only address the dark money
100 Compare H.R. 781, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing amendment of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and other sections to modify the political activity prohibition to permit statements “made in the ordinary course of the organization’s regular and customary activities in carrying out its exempt purpose” and “resulting” in the organization
incurring no more than de minimis incremental expenses”) with H.R. 172, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing
amendment of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to repeal the political activity prohibition in its entirety).
101 See supra note 95.
102 See Letter from Gregory L. Colvin, Chair, Drafting Comm. of the Bright Lines Project, & Lisa Gilbert, Director, Cong. Watch & Bright Lines Project, to Amy F. Giuliano, Office of the Assoc. Chief Counsel
(Tax Exempt and Gov. Entities) (Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.brightlinesproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2014-11-15-draft-Regs-and-Cover-FINAL.pdf.
103 See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 47, at 402–04; Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt
Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 440–44 (2011); Letter from Lawrence Norden, Deputy Dir., Democracy Program, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, et al. to John A. Koskinen, Comm’r,
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concern, however, if they sharply reduce the amount of permitted political activity
by non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits, while they only (partially) eliminate the
fly-by-night concern if they go the other direction by eliminating the limitation (and
so eliminate the need to create fly-by-night non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits).
They also of course do not address the issue of churches, since they do not relate to
§ 501(c)(3) charities.
And even those proposals that sharply reduce the amount of political activity
likely do not fully resolve dark money concerns or underreporting concerns for two
reasons. First, reduced limits (or even an absolute prohibition) could lead to more
underreporting of such activity. And second, if the reduced limit was sufficiently
enforced, it is likely that anonymous political spending would simply move to taxable
entities for which the IRS lacks a tax exemption hook for limiting political activity.104
That hook is important, because the court decisions noted earlier that have upheld tax
limits on political activity in the face of constitutional attacks were based on those
limits being conditions on a discretionary tax benefit.105 It is less clear that such a
hook is necessary for tax law disclosure provisions, but those disclosure requirements
would both run counter to the taxpayer privacy rules that generally apply to taxable
entities and might not be very well enforced by the IRS, as appears to have been the
case with the existing 527 disclosure requirements.106 While there have been
proposals to make 527 status mandatory for all organizations primarily engaged in
political activity, including for-profit entities, it is unclear whether doing so would
be constitutional.107 A related proposal would require public disclosure of
information regarding both donors to and expenditures by tax-exempt organizations
engaged in political activity, which tax law already requires for 527s, but does not
generally require for other types of tax-exempt organizations.108 However, this
Internal Revenue Serv. (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/comments-irs-proposal-canlimit-secret-election-spending; Letter from Brian Galle, Assoc. Professor, Boston Coll. Law Sch. & Donald
Tobin, John C. Elam/Vorys Sater Professor of Law, Ohio State University Moritz Coll. of Law to John A.
Koskinen, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Feb. 24, 2014) 2-3, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399315; Darrell M. West, The Need for Improved Transparency, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 22, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/09/22/the-need-for-improvedtransparency/.
104 See generally Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next “Loophole”?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41 (2007).
105 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 47, at 404–05 (suggesting encouraging tax-exempt organizations to move
political spending into 527s by taxing such spending if it occurs outside a 527); Letter from Lawrence Norden
et. al., to John A. Koskinen, supra note 103, at 2 (limiting political activity by 501(c) organizations); Letter
from Brian Galle & Donald Tobin to John A. Koskinen, supra note 103, at 2–3 (same plus rules to limit the use
of for-profit entities to evade section 527). See also Aprill, supra note 47, at 402–03 (suggesting creation of a
new category of tax-exempt organizations that engage primarily in political activities, including lobbying). The
government appears to permit political organizations to choose to forgo section 527 tax-exempt status, as it
conceded that this was an option when it defended the section 527 disclosure provisions against a constitutional
challenge. See Brief of United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 5 & n.4, Nat’l Fed’n
of Republican Assemblies v. U.S., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (No. 00-759-RV-C).
108 See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 47, at 403–04; Tobin, supra note 70, at 440–41. The one other exception
is the tax law requirement of public disclosure of donors by private foundations, a subset of charitable nonprofit
organizations that are primarily funded by a single donor or small group of donors and otherwise deemed by
Congress not to be sufficiently accountable to the public without such disclosure. See I.R.C. § 6104(b) (second
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proposal is vulnerable to the limited ability of the IRS to facilitate and police such
disclosure requirements, as already noted.
B. FIXING ELECTION LAW AND THE FEC
Since the activity of concern here relates to candidates for elected public office,
it makes sense to consider instead modifications to election law at both the federal
and state level, as well as possibly to the FEC and its state counterparts, to address
the above concerns. Proposals in this area tend to cluster around expanding the
entities and/or activities that trigger election law disclosure and disclaimer
requirements, depoliticizing the FEC and its state counterparts to prevent both
partisan gridlock and capture, and reducing the disclosure requirements relating to
relatively small donors.
1. EXPENDING DISCLOSURES AND DISCLAIMERS
These proposals are aimed squarely at the dark money and underreporting
concern.109 Either by expanding the universe of entities required to publicly disclose
their sources of funds both in reports and through disclaimers on their
communications or by expanding the election-related activities that trigger such
disclosures and disclaimers, these proposals aim to eliminate dark money entirely.110
While it might be thought that the constitutional barriers that drove the relatively
narrow express advocacy definition would prevent such expansion, that likely is not
true. For example, while the Supreme Court pre-Citizens United narrowed the
definition of electioneering communications by requiring that they be the “functional
equivalent” of express advocacy, this was only for purposes of the (now defunct)
prohibition on corporations and unions funding such communications.111 The
Supreme Court has since made clear that for purposes of disclosure no such
equivalence is required.112 This at least suggests that Congress and state legislatures
could go even further by, for example, requiring public disclosure and disclaimers
for any communications that clearly refer to a candidate and are made relatively close
in time to an election, without running afoul of the First Amendment. As for
underreporting, the greater efficiency of the FEC even in its current form with respect
to identifying at least inadequate disclosure as compared to the IRS, and the ability
of the federal government to bring criminal charges against individuals who
intentionally fail to meet their disclosure and disclaimer obligations, would at least
sentence), (d)(3)(A) (2012). See generally Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical
Perspective on Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 52 (2000).
109 See, e.g., For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 4100-4801 (2019); Democracy is
Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act of 2018, H.R. 6239, 115th Cong. (2018); Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act (DISCLOSE) Act of 2015, H.R. 430, 114th
Cong. (2015); Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act (DISCLOSE) Act of
2015, S. 229, 114th Cong. (2015); Van Hollen v. FEC, 74 F. Supp. 3d 407 (D.D.C. 2014) (successful challenge
of FEC disclosure regulation reducing required public disclosures), rev’d, No. 15-5016, 2016 WL 2678200
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
110 See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 47; Shaw, supra note 47, at 167–68.
111 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 482 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
112 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010).
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partially address this concern.
There is still a risk of fly-by-night entities, but the FEC has a much more rapid
enforcement capability than the IRS generally does, plus again the credible threat of
criminal penalties makes the creation of such entities to intentionally violate the
applicable laws significantly riskier for the individuals involved. As for churches,
the imposition of enhanced disclosure and disclaimer requirements on even
religiously based messages, if communicated through mass media channels, could
provide a (limited) backstop to the Johnson Amendment.
2. RESTRUCTURING THE FEC
Of course, the above proposals require a relatively effective FEC. Many
commentators have criticized the performance of the FEC over the years, however,
in large part because the even, party-line split of the commissioners can and
increasingly has led to deadlocks on enforcement actions and guidance.113 At least
according to these critics, these deadlocks have both prevented enforcement of the
existing rules in many instances and also prevented the issuance of needed guidance
for implementing those rules in a manner consistent with congressional intent.114
113 See, e.g., R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R40779, DEADLOCKED VOTES AMONG MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (FEC): OVERVIEW AND POTENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 8 (2009) (for the period July 2008 through June 2009 all substantive deadlocks involved party-line votes);

Michael M. Franz, The Federal Election Commission as Regulator: The Changing Evaluations of Advisory
Opinions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 735, 753, 755 (2013); (“the FEC after 2006 is best characterized as
conflicted and increasingly unable to offer clear and unidirectional advice”); Daniel P. Tokaji, Beyond
Repair: FEC Reform and Deadlock Deference, in DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN
FINANCE IN AMERICA 172, 179–84 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018); Nicholas
Confessore, Election Panel Enacts Policies by Not Acting, N.Y. TIMES at A1 (Aug. 26, 2014); Alec
MacGillis, Open Mic Disaster: The FEC Held a Hearing. It Revealed Almost Everything That’s Wrong With
American Democracy, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/02/fec-hearing-oncampaign-finance-rules-the-agency-appears-pow-erless-to-do-its-job.html; Campaign Legal Center Staff,
Fix the FEC: Background Memorandum on New Bi-partisan Legislation to Address a Dysfunctional
Agency, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/news/
publications-speeches/fix-fec-background-memorandum-new-bi-partisan-legislation-address-0; Press
Release, Pub. Citizen, Roiled in Partisan Deadlock, Federal Election Com-mission is Failing, (2015), https://
www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/fec-deadlock-update-april-2015.pdf. See generally BROOKS JACKSON,
BROKEN PROMISE: WHY THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION FAILED (1990). But see Bradley A. Smith &
Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Over-enforcement at the Federal
Election Commission, 1 ELECTION L.J. 145, 145 (2002) (finding overenforcement may be a greater problem
than underenforcement); Scott Blackburn, Delusions About “Dysfunction”: Under-standing the Federal
Election Commission (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2015/10/05/delu-sions-aboutdysfunction-understanding-the-federal-election-commission/ (supporting existing FEC structure).
114 See, e.g., Oversight of the Federal Election Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules &
Admin., C-SPAN (July 14, 2004), https://www.c-span.org/video/?182694-1/federal-election-commission-oversight&showFullAbstract=1 (testimony of Trevor Potter, President and General Counsel, Campaign Legal
Cen-ter) (declaring that the FEC’s enforcement powers are “cripplingly weak”); R. SAM GARRETT,
CONG. RE-SEARCH SERV. R44319, THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ENFORCEMENT PROCESS AND
SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2015) (summarizing such concerns); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP,
TECHNOL-OGY AND PERFORMANCE AUDIT AND MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION 3–6 to 3–7 (1999) (citing the consensus of eight interviewed legal practitioners that the
enforcement process took a long time to resolve alleged violations and reporting that most of them
believed that the then current FEC enforcement did not create a strong deterrent effect), http://
www.gao.gov/special.pubs/fecrpt.pdf; FRANK J. SO-RAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 254–57 (1988)
(pronouncing general agreement, at least in 1988, that the FEC’s enforcement efforts were both slow and
timid, and attributing these flaws primarily to congressional efforts to keep its enforcement efforts limited);
Michael M. Franz, The Devil We Know? Evaluating the FEC as Enforcer, 8 ELECTION L.J. 167, 167–68
(2009); Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of Campaign Finance
Laws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891, 1893 (“although its critics differ as to the
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Therefore, another set of proposals seeks to significantly restructure the FEC,
including shifting more decision-making authority to career staff and replacing the
six-member Commission with a single, fixed-term executive.115 Similar concerns
and proposals also exist at the state level.
3. REDUCING DISCLOSURE OF SMALLER DONORS
Part of the opposition to such reforms—both among commentators and at the
FEC—arises from the fact that current election law disclosure requirements have
relatively low triggers (usually aggregate contributions of more than $200 during a
two-year election cycle). State election laws also often have similarly low triggers.116
Besides imposing a significant administrative burden on both political organizations
and the enforcing agencies, such low triggers may deter many from either giving or
giving above the triggers because it would lead to others knowing about their political
preferences. At the same time, disclosure of such relatively modest contributors
seems unlikely to provide much information to other voters, to prevent corruption or
the appearance of corruption, or to reveal violations of the applicable contribution
limits.
For these reasons, a third set of proposals would increase the trigger levels for
disclosures and set relatively high limits, such as only requiring the identity of the
five largest donors to an organization making a given communication, for
disclaimers.117 The reasoning is that the dark money concern primarily relates to
large donors, not ones giving only a few hundred dollars. At the same time, the
pressure to create fly by night entities might be modestly relaxed by such increases,
although to the extent they are driven by a handful of large donors that pressure would
not be relieved. And of course, these proposals would have little effect on churches
or other § 501(c)(3) charities intentionally violating the tax law prohibition on
political activity.

causes of the problem, almost all agree that the FEC fails to effectively enforce the law”), 1895–96 (1999).
115 See, e.g., H.R. 5676, 109th Cong. § 101(a) (2006) (amending FECA § 361 to grant the Chair of the
new Federal Election Administration new powers); JACKSON, supra note 113, at 63–64 (arguing for a new
structure for the FEC); John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way Forward, 3 ELECTION L.J. 115,
115, 119–20 (2004) (discussing proposed legislation to replace the FEC); see also PROJECT FEC, NO BARK, NO
BITE, NO POINT. THE CASE FOR CLOSING THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION AND ESTABLISHING A NEW
SYSTEM FOR ENFORCING THE NATION’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 2 (2002) (proposing the creation of new
election-law agency with a single administrator); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent
Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 275–78 (arguing that independent agencies would, in general, improve their
effectiveness by having a single administrator but who, in deference to congressional concerns, could be removed for cause by Congress). But see Tokaji, supra note 112, at 185–89.
116 See Disclosure, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., https://cfinst.github.io/#disclosure?question=CandDonorExemption&year=2016 (last visited May 10, 2019) (graphical representation of donor disclosure thresholds in the
fifty states, filtered for 2016).
117 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting with Dollars,
91 CAL. L. REV. 643, 655 (2003); William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political
Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 53–54 (2003); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 327; Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 107–10 (2010); Shaw, supra note 47, at 171; David Lourie, Note,
Rethinking Donor Disclosure After the Proposition 8 Campaign, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 154–70 (2009).
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C. FIXING NONPROFIT LAW AND STATE ENFORCEMENT
Driven in part by a lack of traction for any of the above proposals, some
commentators and even states have turned to modifying state nonprofit law. The
most prominent example of this approach are the efforts by a few states to require
“charitable” organizations (usually defined broadly enough to encompass § 501(c)(4)
social welfare organizations) to submit their IRS-required donor lists to the state
agency that oversees such organizations, although not for public disclosure.118 It is
unclear, however, what doing that does to address any of the concerns previously
identified, unless it would either deter donors from giving to such organizations in
the first place (which could impact entities that are not engaged in any political
activity as well, particularly if they are involved with controversial causes) or could
lead to more easy identification of organizations redirecting charitable funds to
perhaps prohibited political activity. At least two states have explored other, nonelection law options for regulating money in politics by using their laws governing
nonprofit organizations, but both those states ultimately chose to pursue public
disclosure of political spending primarily through their election laws.119 These
proposals are also undermined by the relative lack of enforcement resources for state
agencies with respect to overseeing charities.
III. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
The above discussion illustrates the legal, factual, and policy complexity of this
area. At the same time, it provides some hints as to how to approach the concerns
identified. This part first addresses whether the identified concerns are legitimate
and then how best to comprehensively address the ones that are.
A. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE IDENTIFIED CONCERNS
There are three policy decisions that underlie the above-identified concerns. The
first is the decision by Congress not to “subsidize” political activity by prohibiting
direct or indirect tax deductions for such activity, even when such activity furthers a
charitable or business purpose. The second is the decision partially adopted by
Congress and state legislatures to require public disclosures and disclaimers with
respect to the sources of funding for political activity in order to increase voter
information, prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, and backstop the
limits on contributions to candidates and political parties. I say partially because
Congress (and most states) do not appear to have pushed such disclosures to their
118 See supra note 63.
119 See Linda Sugin, Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501(c)(4) Organizations, 91 CHI.KENT L. REV. 895 (2016); Independent Expenditure Reporting, N.Y. ST. BD. ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.ny.gov/IndependentExpenditureReporting.html. (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). Several other states have also
recently expanded required disclosures under their election laws. See Campaign Finance Legislation Database
| 2015 Onward, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 7, 2019) http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/disclosure-and-reporting-requirements/campaign-finance-database-2015-onward.aspx (search by
topic (disclosure), status (enacted), and year (2016) reveals fifty-four enacted bills in twenty-nine states for
2016, many of which appear to have increased disclosure obligations).
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constitutional limits. The third is a general concern about the influence of money in
politics, particularly when wealthy sources are able to spend unlimited amounts on
political activity.
1. TAXING POLITICS
Under federal law, the amount of income subject to tax is determined by reducing
a taxpayer’s gross income by permitted deductions in order to arrive at taxable
income. With respect to political activity, this raises the issue of whether
expenditures for political activity—whether in the form of contributions to others to
support political activity by those third parties or expenses incurred directly to
communicate political messages or engage in other candidate and election-related
activities—should be deductible.
In general, taxpayers should be permitted to deduct those expenses they incur in
order to generate income. This principle arises from the fact that the income tax is a
tax on net income, not gross receipts. The most common examples of such expenses
are business expenses (expenses incurred to further profit-seeking activities) and
investment expenses (expenses incurred to generate investment returns).120 Other
expenses are generally considered “personal” expenses, for which Congress has
denied deductibility as a general matter.121 That said, Congress has chosen to permit
the deduction of many personal expenses for non-tax reasons, including, for example,
the well-known mortgage interest and charitable contribution deductions (although
only if taxpayers itemize their deductions, as opposed to taking the standard
deduction).122 Congress has also, in a few contexts, declined to permit deductions
for certain expenses even though incurred in order to generate income—most notably
fines, penalties, certain illegal payments, and most expenses for illegal drug
businesses.123 Nevertheless, the general principle is that expenses are only deductible
if incurred in order to generate income.
While simple to state, application of this principle can be complicated in practice.
Many expenditures result in both income-generating and personal benefits, raising
the question of whether, and to what extent, they should be deductible under this
principle.124 Another way of phrasing this issue is how close a connection there must
be between a given expenditure and the generation of income for deductibility to
apply, in whole or in part.
Current federal tax law generally prohibits the deduction of expenses incurred
for political activity, whether directly or through contributions to another entity. 125
This rule is consistent with the general principle with respect to deductions if
120 See I.R.C. §§ 162(a) (2012), 212 (2012).
121 I.R.C. § 262(a) (2012).
122 See I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)(D) (2012), 170 (2012 & Supp. V 2017).
123 See I.R.C. §§ 162(c), (e), (f), 280E (2018).
124 See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach
to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (1974); Adi Libson, Taxing Status: Tax Treatment of Mixed
Business and Personal Expenses, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1139 (2015).
125 See I.R.C. §§ 162(e), 6033(e) (2018) (also prohibiting a deduction for lobbying expenses), 6033(e)
(same) (2018); Polsky, supra note 29, at 1775–76.

Journal of Legislation

221

spending on political activity is viewed as a personal expense. For the vast majority
of such spending that is clearly the correct view—individuals usually engage in such
spending, whether directly or indirectly through entities, to promote their personal
political preferences. Furthermore, candidates and political parties incur such
expenses to pursue their political agendas, not in order to seek a profit.
But some individuals, and probably many businesses, make political activity
expenditures for income-generating purposes. For example, a business spends
money to support the election of candidate X because candidate X is more likely than
their opponent(s) to support a policy that will help that business. The problem with
this argument is that except in relatively rare situations, supporting candidate X
supports the candidate’s entire platform, not just the policy position of interest to the
spender. Therefore, the connection between the expenses and the desired, incomerelated outcome is relatively attenuated. As a result, except in rare circumstances—
for example, the candidate running for a position with a very narrow range of
functions—the connection between the expense and income generation is too remote
to support permitting the deduction of the expense. And given that this circumstance
is likely to be relatively rare and such expenses will almost always be a very small
portion of any individual or business’ overall expenses, administrative convenience
suggests it is better to have a bright line rule of non-deductibility than to leave a
potential area of highly factual disputes in circumstances that are the uncommon
exception.
There are three important caveats to this conclusion. First, federal tax law is not
without some loopholes in this area, most notably the fact that tax-exempt veterans
organizations are both eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions and able to
engage in unlimited political activity (if it furthers their required, veteran-supporting
purpose).126 While the Supreme Court has concluded that the differing treatment of
veterans organizations as compared to other types of tax-exempt organizations when
it comes to permitted types of speech is constitutional, it is inconsistent with the
general principles relating to deductibility and should be eliminated.127 As a practical
matter, however, there appear to have been few if any groups that have taken
advantage of this loophole.
Second, this conclusion does not apply to businesses for which politics is their
business—that is, their profit-making activity. So, for example, political consultants
and media firms should be (and are) permitted to deduct expenses relating to political
activity, as they engage in such activity primarily to generate income (although some
such businesses may also be committed to a particular political ideology).
Third and finally, this conclusion does not address proposals to permit a
deduction or tax credit for political contribution not based on general tax policy
principles but instead to encourage involvement in political campaigns or to reduce
the influence of special interests.128 Such proposals are beyond the scope of this
126 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
127 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1983).
128 See, e.g., DAVID ROSENBERG, BROADENING THE BASE: THE CASE FOR A NEW FEDERAL TAX CREDIT
FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (2002); Debra Burke, Twenty Years After the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974: Look Who’s Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357 (1995); Thomas Cmar, Toward a Small
Donor Democracy: The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions, 32 FORDHAM
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Article, as they do not contest the tax policy basis for Congress’ decision not to permit
a deduction for political activity expenditures. They instead rely on a non-tax policy
rationale that would require a separate article (or book) to fully consider.
None of these caveats therefore undermine the soundness of Congress’ decision
not to permit a deduction, directly or indirectly, for political activity expenditures.
And since the denial of such a deduction for purposes of calculating taxable income
is squarely within the purview of both the Internal Revenue Code and the IRS, as
well as the procedures and enforcement mechanisms developed and deployed by the
IRS, there is no institutional reason to abandon this policy or the tax rules that
implement it.
2. DISCLOSING POLITICS
As spending on political activity has grown, both in absolute amounts and in the
proportion coming from a relatively small number of large donors or unknown
sources, there is a growing concern that it is distorting the legislative priorities of
politicians dependent on this spending and increasingly undermining public
confidence in our democratic system.129 These developments are especially troubling
to many because they indicate an increasing level of influence for wealthy business
interests and individuals, to the detriment of other interests and individuals, and often
without the voting public even being aware of who is funding the communications
with which it is bombarded.130 And while the candidate who attracts the most funding
is not guaranteed to win any given election (as demonstrated recently by many of the
2018 contests), it is generally agreed that the amount of money raised is still relevant
both for giving a candidate a realistic shot at winning and for increasing a candidate’s
odds of winning.131
URB. L.J. 443 (2005); John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591
(2005); Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 73, 107–18 (2004). Such a tax credit actually existed from 1971 to 1986. See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-178, §§ 701-702, 85 Stat. 497, 560-62 (repealed in 1978 (deduction) and 1986 (credit)). Another
commentator has proposed using the tax laws to limit political contributions by replacing campaign contribution
ceilings with graduated campaign contribution taxes. See David S. Gamage, Note, Taxing Political Donations:
The Case for Corrective Taxes in Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283 (2004).
129 See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 54 (2016) (“[M]oney can influence who is elected to office, which
in turn affects legislative outcomes [and] often buys access and cooperation, permitting those with wealth . . .
to affect legislative policy.”); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576 (2014) (the preferences of interest groups
and economic elites have a substantial impact on public policy, while the preferences of average citizens have
little independent impact); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV.
191 (2012); Frank Pasquale, First Amendment Freeze Play: Bennett’s Strategy for Entrenching Inequality, 164
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 215 (2016); Jessie Romero, Money Talks: Legal Changes Have Opened the Door to
New Kinds of Political Spending. What Does the Money Buy?, ECON FOCUS: FOURTH QUARTER 2014, at 16,
19-20 (summarizing research); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV.
1425, 1467–68 (2015) (empirical evidence indicates governmental outputs align more with rich and with political campaign donors than with any other group and non-donors, respectively).
130 See Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 1847, 1849 (2013); Potter & Morgan, supra note 47, at 384–85.
131 See HASEN, supra note 129, at 58 (“Money does not buy political outcomes, but, along with candidate
quality and campaign organization, it is important to winning elections.”); Michael S. Kang, The Year of the
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There also is a strong argument that disclosure of funding sources likely reduces
the risk of corruption (and the appearance of corruption).132 While the
corruption/appearance of corruption rationale is weakened when the funding is for
political activity conducted in a manner that is truly independent of the candidates
supported, it is still relatively strong, especially given the increasing spending on
elections and therefore the reasonable presumption that cash-strapped candidates
who benefit from such spending will be particularly grateful.133 At the same time,
disclosure does raise concerns that it could chill participation, a point addressed in
the next section.134
There also is evidence supporting the voter information rationale found by the
Supreme Court to support disclosure in the face of constitutional challenges.135 This
is particularly true when the disclosure comes in the form of disclaimers on the
communications paid for by identified funders.136 This rationale therefore provides
a separate basis for disclosure of funding sources for political activity.
While not everyone agrees that changes in the aggregate amount and sources of
money in politics are having a negative effect, the perception they are is gaining
increasing traction and therefore fueling the push to enhance the regulation of these
flows. This in turn strongly suggests that, at a minimum, it would be desirable to
know the sources of that money, and particularly the largest such sources (and so
likely the most influential and potentially corrupting sources) in order to see whether
the claimed negative effects of money in politics actually exist. It may be that,
contrary to the research to date, such analysis will reveal only limited, if any, shifting
of political positions and preferences of elected politicians, but there is no way to be
even reasonably confident this is the case without the data regarding funding sources
to consider in the first place.
3. PAYING FOR POLITICS
There is longstanding debate regarding how political activity is funded and
whether our current system’s general reliance on private funding and a lack of limits
Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1904–06 (2013) (SuperPACs did not provide a decisive partisan
edge in 2012, although they did increase the prominence and influence of the very wealthy in national politics);
Michael Beckel, How to Waste a Billion Dollars, POLITICO (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/11/money-in-politics-waste-billion-dollars-koch-brothers-213374; Peter Overby, Jeb Bush
Proves
Money
Isn’t
Everything
in
Politics,
NPR
(Nov.
19,
2015),
https://www.npr.org/2015/11/19/456619737/jeb-bush-proves-money-isnt-everything-in-politics.
132 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics and the Public’s Right to Know, 13 ELECTION L.J. 138, 146–47
(2014).
133 Id. at 155–56; see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) (“[T]here is a
serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal
stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by
raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”).
134 Mayer, supra note 132, at 156–57.
135 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369–70 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196
(2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68, 80–81 (1976).
136 See Travis N. Ridout et al., Sponsorship, Disclosure and Donors: Limiting the Impact of Outside
Group Ads, 68 POL. RES. Q. 68 (2015); Conor M. Dowling & Amber Wichowsky, Does It Matter Who’s Behind
the Curtain? Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 41 AM. POL.
RES. 965 (2013).
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on expenditures is detrimental to our democratic form of government. The rules
relating to the involvement of nonprofits in political activity do not, however, have
much impact on this larger debate for several reasons. First, and as already noted,
individuals and entities seeking to fund political activity are not limited to using
nonprofit vehicles for doing so and therefore, even if all nonprofits were prohibited
from engaging in political activity, that funding would likely find an outlet through
other types of entities.137
Second, nonprofits that are currently permitted to engage in political activity
serve as vehicles for others—individuals and for-profit entities—to act collectively
to fund such activity but are not generally themselves the initial sources of funds for
such activity. Indeed one aspect of Congress’ decision to not allow deductions for
political activity is that any tax-exempt organizations that engage in political activity
are taxed on their investment income that otherwise would be tax-exempt (and so
usually avoid such income).138 While this taxation does not extend to profits realized
from activities related to the nonprofit’s exempt purpose, other restrictions on the
activities of non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits tend to limit such activities.139 So
concerns about the amount money in politics and its sources need to address the
ultimate sources of those funds—individuals and for-profit entities—as opposed to
nonprofits.
Third and finally, the constitutional concerns highlighted in the next section
sharply limit the ability of governments to address this concern, particularly with
respect to nonprofits. Long before the Citizens United decision, the Supreme Court
had recognized a First Amendment-compelled exception from the prohibition on
corporate spending on political activity for independent nonprofits that had a clear
ideological message and were funded exclusively by individuals.140 In addition, the
Supreme Court found the limits on lobbying by charities to be constitutionally
acceptable in part because a charity had the option of setting up a tax-exempt but
noncharitable nonprofit affiliate to engage in unlimited lobbying. Therefore, absent
a fundamental shift in how the Supreme Court applies the First Amendment in this
context, the ability of governments to limit political activity by all non-charitable
nonprofits could be constitutionally suspect.
This is not to say that concerns about money in politics do not have merit. But
it is to say that attempting to address those concerns through legal rules targeting
nonprofits or their activities is likely to be ineffective both because of hydraulic
effects—the money will find a way through other channels—and constitutionally
fraught. The solution I develop in this part therefore will not attempt to address these
larger concerns.

137 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
138 See I.R.C. § 527(f) (2018).
139 See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (2018) (prohibiting section 501(c)(6) organizations from engaging in “a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit”).
140 See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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4. PROTECTING FREE SPEECH, FREE ASSOCIATION, & FREE EXERCISE
If only the tax policy against allowing the deduction of political activity
expenditures and the interests furthered by disclosing sources of political funding
were at stake, pursuing these policies would be an easy choice. There are, however,
important countervailing concerns. Those concerns are embodied in the First
Amendment and relate to free speech, the related right to free association, and,
particularly for churches, free exercise of religion.
Turning first to free speech and free association, nonprofits have a long history
of involvement in political discussions and serve as vehicles for diverse groups to
provide input into political decisions, including with respect to which candidates
should be elected. Laws that would unduly limit or prohibit that involvement are
therefore undesirable and indeed may be unconstitutional. There also is mixed
empirical evidence regarding whether existing public disclosure requirements chill
political participation by causing potential donors to either forgo giving or to give at
amounts below the disclosure thresholds.141 Nevertheless, the reasonable possibility
that disclosure may chill political participation in this fashion cautions against
disclosure that is unnecessary to further the interests that support disclosure. It is for
this reason that a number of commentators, with a variety of views on the merits of
disclosure more generally, have proposed significantly increasing the threshold
amounts that trigger disclosure.142
Consideration also has to be given to the burden on free exercise of religion that
the application of the Johnson Amendment to churches creates. As a constitutional
matter, the Supreme Court has found that the ability of charities to create closely
affiliated, but non-charitable entities through which to channel desired political
activity provides a sufficient vehicle for engaging in such activity—First Amendment
concerns notwithstanding—while still vindicating the congressional choice not to
allow tax deductible funds to be used for such activity.143 This conclusion does not
apply as easily to churches and messages from the pulpit, however, because of the
special significance of the method of delivery in this context.144 This consideration
suggests that some type of accommodation is required for this situation, whether
compelled by the First Amendment (or the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act145) or as a matter of sound policy.
B. COMPREHENSIVELY ADDRESSING THESE CONCERNS
Any comprehensive approach to political activity by nonprofits therefore has to
address both the need to prevent nonprofits from being used to render funds
141 Compare Ray J. La Raja, Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of Transparency on Making Small Campaign Contributions, 36 POL. BEHAV. 753 (2014) with Abby Wood & Douglas
M. Spencer, In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effect of Transparency on State Political Campaigns, 15 ELECTION
L.J. 1 (2016).
142 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
143 See supra note 33.
144 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and
Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137 (2009). As developed in this earlier article and summarized
briefly at the end of section III.B.1.a. infra, one way to address this situation would be to allow churches to
include political messages in their in-person, internal communications with their members during worship
services. Id. Nina J. Crimm, Laurence H. Winer, and Edward A. Zelinsky have also developed similar
proposals to address the constitutional and policy concerns that the current prohibition raises with respect to
churches and other houses of worship. See CRIMM & WINER, supra note 16, at 337-52; EDWARD A.
ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH: RELIGION, EXEMPTIONS, ENTANGLEMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION 202-06
(2017).
145 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2018).
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contributed or spent for such activity deductible for federal income tax purposes and
the need to publicly disclose the sources of such funds as reasonably necessary to
inform voters, prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, and backstop
contribution limits, without unduly preventing nonprofits and their supporters from
being engaged in the political process. It also has to consider the relative strengths
of federal tax law and the IRS as compared to election law and the FEC (and its state
counterparts) and as compared to state nonprofit law and the state agencies that
implement that law. Finally, it needs to be robust enough to be avoid being
undermined even given that the high stakes, winner-take-all field of politics tends to
encourage aggressive exploitation of any regulatory arbitrage opportunities.146
1. REFORMING TAX LAW
There are several issues raised by the above discussion relating to taxing politics
and disclosing politics through provisions in federal tax law: (1) to what extent taxexempt nonprofits should be limited with respect to their political activity; (2) how
specifically should political activity and those limits be defined; and (3) to what
extent should federal tax law require public disclosure of information relating to such
activity and particularly the identities of donors. To consider these three issues, it is
helpful to consider separately the political activity rules relating to the three major
types of tax-exempt nonprofits: charities; non-charitable but not solely political taxexempt nonprofits; and political organizations.
a.

CHARITIES

The so-called Johnson Amendment prohibition on charities engaging in political
activity is both consistent with the sound policy of not permitting a deduction for
contributions to support such activity and provides a clear, bright line limit. At the
same time, however, its reliance on an all relevant facts and circumstances “smell
test”147 for defining what is prohibited political activity creates enforcement and
compliance difficulties and may raise constitutional concerns because of its

146 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
949, 958–59 (2005) (emergence of 527s); Frances R. Hill, Citizens United and Social Welfare Organizations:
The Tangled Relationships Among Guidance, Compliance, and Enforcement, 43 STETSON L. REV. 539, 552–59
(2014) [hereinafter Hill, Social Welfare Organizations] (emergence of other types of tax-exempt organizations);
Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 to Design a New Campaign Finance Vehicle, 26 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 205 (1999) (emergence of 527s); Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 56–59 (2004) (emergence of other types of tax-exempt organizations).
147 See EO Committee of ABA Tax Section Offers Commentary on Politicking, 11 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 854, 856 (1995) (stating that the IRS appears to have been using a “smell test” to determine what constitutes prohibited political activity, without any unifying principle); Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A
Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities of TaxExempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 64–71, 65 n.39 (2004) (summarizing the existing guidance regarding what exactly constitutes prohibited political activity and concluding that the definition remains
frustratingly ambiguous); OMB WATCH, THE IRS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM FOR CHARITIES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 12-13 (2006) (arguing that the IRS continues to use what is essentially
a “smell test” when more bright line rules are needed).
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vagueness.148 This suggests that a better rule would more clearly define what is, and
what is not, prohibited political activity for charities.
As noted earlier, the Bright Lines Project has attempted to create such a clearer
definition.149 In an attempt to only reach what is clearly political activity, however,
that Project has proposed regulations that are lengthy and detailed, including a sevenpart definition for “per se intervention” and eight detailed safe harbors.150 While
such detail may resolve vagueness concerns from a constitutional perspective, they
create a complicated regulatory regime to apply from the perspective of both taxexempt organizations and IRS agents. The Bright Lines Project proposal also retains
the facts and circumstances test for any activities not covered by the detailed rules.151
A simpler definition would therefore be preferable for purposes of the prohibition
on political activity by charities, so that not only sophisticated charities but also the
many relatively unsophisticated charities can readily comply with the law.
Furthermore, the simpler definition should err on the side of overbreadth to prevent
gaming, given that individuals seeking to avoid the prohibition could either cause the
charity with which they are associated to create a non-charitable affiliate or choose
instead to create a separate, non-charitable (although still tax-exempt) entity.
Especially with the reduced importance of the charitable contribution deduction to
many donors who will no longer itemize their deductions for federal income tax
purposes, the costs of operating through a non-charitable entity are less significant
than they have been in the past.152 Combined with the proposal below to eliminate
the limit on political activity by such entities, it would make coming together to
engage in political activity much simpler for federal tax purposes while avoiding any
tax-driven subsidy for such activity.
What would such a definition look like? One place to look for inspiration would
be the definition of electioneering communications in federal election law, but
expanded to cover all communications.153 Under this expanded definition, any
communication (including over the Internet) that clearly referred to a candidate and
was made within a specific timeframe before the relevant election would be
considered political activity. To prevent “political party” simply replacing
“candidate,” the definition should also be expanded to include communications that
clearly referred to a political party as well as ones that clearly referred to a candidate.
To cover situations involving financial or other support for a candidate or political
party not relating to communications, the definition should also include any provision
of funds, services, or goods to a candidate or political party. An exception would
apply if such provision is done in a manner that is available on the same terms to any
148 See Freedom Path, Inc. v. IRS, 913 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting a challenge on these grounds,
but because of standing concerns and so not reaching the merits); Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes
Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity
Unconstitutional? 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 918–28 (2011).
149 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
150 See Letter from Gregory L. Colvin & Lisa Gilbert, supra note 102.
151 See id.
152 See Gene Takagi, A prediction for nonprofits in 2018: Rise of the 501(c)(4) organizations, NONPROFIT LAW BLOG (Jan. 25, 2018), http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/a-prediction-for-nonprofits-in-2018-riseof-the-501c4-organizations/.
153 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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member of the public.
What about historically nonpartisan activities of charities, such as public officials
(who may also be candidates) speaking at events, nonpartisan voter registration and
education, or hosting unbiased candidate forums? For the former, it would be
simplest to have the same blackout period as for communications. There is usually
no particular need to have the fundraising event or other activity close in time to the
relevant election. For voter registration and education, there could be a narrow
exception for voter registration materials that necessarily mention political parties,
but again for the sake of simplicity, education communications that mention
candidates—even current public officials—should be required to occur outside of the
blackout window. Finally, for candidate forums, there could be a narrow exception
for such events. Since only a relatively small number of charities engage in such
activities, the increased complexity created by adding such an exception would not
burden the vast majority of charities.
What about advocacy on issues? More specifically, and to take such advocacy
to its election-related extreme, should charities be permitted to urge the public, for
example, to “Vote Pro-Life” or “Vote Pro-Choice” even when candidates are clearly
divided on the issue? Currently, the IRS theoretically polices such activity as
potentially prohibited political activity. But in practice, there appear to be few if any
IRS enforcement actions based on such activity when there is not a clear reference to
a specific candidate or political party.154 Therefore, it appears that such activities
should be permitted, particularly since the stances of most charities engaged in public
policy issues are obvious, even if such stances are not stated explicitly. For example,
consider such politically active charities like Planned Parenthood, the NAACP, and
the Heritage Foundation; to the extent they urge the public to vote, their policyrelated reasons for doing so are fairly obvious, so little is gained by preventing them
from explicitly stating those policy goals (without clearly referring to any candidates
or political parties).
The situation of churches and other houses of worship is more complicated,
however, because of the free exercise concerns mentioned earlier combined with the
unique communication platform that the pulpit provides. Churches should therefore
be allowed to include political messages in their in-person, internal communications
with their members during worship services. The impact of such messages is likely
to be limited given that pastors would be preaching to people who are likely already
aware of their pastor’s political leanings. To prevent abuse, however, the prohibition
on political activity should extend to other forms of communication in order to avoid
opening the door to broader distribution of such messages, including to the general
public. This is justifiable in part because unlike in-person sermons from the pulpit,
other forms of communications could be done—and paid for—by a non-charitable
affiliate using nondeductible funds.
b. NON-CHARITABLE, TAX-EXEMPT NONPROFITS

154 See JUDITH E. KINDELL & JOHN FRANCIS REILLY, ELECTION YEAR ISSUES 335, 344–46 (2001),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf.
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The situation with non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits such as § 501(c)(4)
social welfare organizations, § 501(c)(5) labor unions, and § 501(c)(6) trade
associations is different, however. Because of the lack of charitable contribution
deduction for donations to such organizations, and because of the notice and proxy
tax provisions that effectively prevent a business expense deduction for payments to
such groups, there is no tax policy reason to limit the amount of political activity by
such organizations. At the same time, the uncertainty created by the existing
“primary” activity test for the amount of permitted political activity is problematic
from an enforcement and compliance perspective, even if the definition of political
activity was clarified in the same manner as proposed above for charities.
For all of these reasons and as Roger Colinvaux has persuasively argued, there
is no tax policy justification for limiting the political activity of such nonprofits.155
With respect to disclosure, the only reason to limit such activity—or to tighten that
limit—is if it would force such activity toward § 527 organizations that are subject
to extensive public disclosure requirements. But, as detailed in the next section, the
inclusion of those requirements in federal tax law and “keying off” of tax status is
unwise and should be eliminated. With that elimination, there is no justification
based on tax policy or disclosure for limiting the political activity of non-charitable,
tax-exempt nonprofits. This eliminates the need to consider how to define such a
limit, or indeed how to define political activity except for purposes of the notice and
proxy tax provisions. For the latter, the same definition proposed for charities should
be sufficient to accomplish the tax policy goal of prohibiting deductions for
contributions to fund such activity.
c.

SECTION 527 POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Political organizations that are tax-exempt under § 527 are, of course, not limited
with respect to their amount of political activity. The breadth and ambiguity of the
definition of what constitutes an “exempt function” for such organizations is
therefore not problematic from a tax enforcement and compliance perspective.156
Where it has proven problematic, however, has been where it allowed undoubtedly
political organizations that fell outside of election law disclosure requirements to
avoid public disclosure of their funding sources and expenditures, at least until
Congress modified § 527 to require such disclosure.157 But in doing so, Congress
inadvertently created another problem.
If an organization has disclosed enough of its activities to demonstrate its
compliance with the requirements for tax-exempt status as a § 527 organization, that
disclosure should be sufficient for tax purposes. Any disclosure beyond this
information, including with respect to publicly identifying contributors, is not
justified as a tax policy matter. More importantly, requiring such disclosure as a
matter of tax law is unwise and indeed dangerous to the primary mission of the tax

155 See Roger Colinvaux, Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption: A Gordian’s Knot, 34 VA. TAX
REV. 1 (2014).
156 See I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (2018).
157 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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law.158 Congress therefore erred in incorporating those disclosure requirements in
the tax laws, as opposed to modifying the election law disclosure requirements to
capture the behavior of 527s that warranted disclosure. In other words, any such
public disclosure provisions do not belong in the tax law but instead belong in
election law.159 So it is to election law, and the FEC, that we now turn.
2. REFORMING ELECTION LAW (AND THE FEC)
There are two aspects of election law that need consideration. The first is the
extent of current public disclosure requirements. The second is the structure of the
FEC in light of its alleged decreasing effectiveness.
a.

DISCLOSING POLITICS

As detailed previously, the existing federal law disclosure requirements are
extensive when it comes to the entities and activities they cover, but they also have a
number of gaps, two of which are particularly significant. The first such gap is that
they generally do not reach entities that do not coordinate their activities with
candidates or political parties and avoid express advocacy and electioneering
communications, even if these entities engage in other communications or activities
that are clearly designed to support or oppose the election of candidates. It was in
this gap that the “stealth PAC” 527s emerged until Congress in 2000 began requiring
disclosures by 527s. However, it is also in this gap that many noncharitable, taxexempt nonprofits such as § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations currently
operate.160
The second gap is for entities that do not coordinate their activities with
candidates or political parties and avoid being classified as a political committee but
do engage in some express advocacy or electioneering communications (with respect
to federal elections). Such entities are required to publicly disclose details about their
spending on such communications but are often able to avoid disclosing the identities
of the contributors whose donations funded that spending. Until recently, this
avoidance was easy because the FEC had interpreted the applicable statutes as only
requiring donor disclosure if a donor had earmarked their donation for a specific
covered communication.161 A federal district court has vacated the relevant
regulation with respect to express advocacy and in the wake of that decision, the FEC
has issued guidance saying that donor disclosure is required if a donor has earmarked
their donation for express advocacy generally.162 But it appears that such an entity
158 See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 155, at 48; Kahng, supra note 73, at 51–52; Mayer, supra note 25;
Donald B. Tobin, The 2013 IRS Crisis: Where Do We Go From Here?, 142 TAX NOTES 1120, 1121 (2014);
supra notes 61, 71 and accompanying text.
159 See Colinvaux, supra note 155, at 6 (suggesting that administration of the current § 527 disclosure
requirements be shifted to the FEC even if those provisions remain in the Internal Revenue Code); Mayer, supra
note 25 (same).
160 See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
161 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi) (2018).
162 See CREW v. FEC, 316 F.Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018); Press Release, FEC, FEC provides guidance
following U.S. District decision in CREW v. FEC, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018) (Oct. 4, 2018),
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still does not have to publicly disclose the identity of donors as long as those donors
do not earmark their contributions at all, and this decision (even if upheld on appeal)
does not apply to electioneering communications.
To address these gaps, Congress (and state legislatures, to the extent these gaps
also exist within state election laws), should make two changes to the existing
disclosure rules. First, the range of activities that trigger disclosure should be
expanded to include all communications (not just broadcast, cable, and satellite) that
clearly refer to a candidate (or political party) and are made within a certain window
before a relevant election. This modification would be similar to the bright line
definition of political activity proposed for the purposes of the tax law’s prohibition
on charities engaging in political activity and has a similar justification: it provides
clarity while also likely capturing almost all communications that are intended to
influence voters with respect to candidates.
Second, public disclosure of donor identities should reach all donors whose funds
could have been used to pay for the covered communications. In other words, only
if donors specifically earmark their donations for other activities should they avoid
such disclosure. Otherwise, it is too easy for donors to simply give without
earmarking (except possibly for hard-to-prove “understandings”) and thereby avoid
disclosure.
In recognition of the free speech and free association values implicated by such
disclosure, however, a third change should also be made. Currently, the aggregate
contribution amounts that trigger donor identity disclosure start as low as over $200
in a calendar year (and sometimes less under state law). Whatever the merits of such
low triggers when contribution limits apply—that is, when contributions are made to
candidates, political parties, or PACs and so there is a concern that multiple straw
donors could be used to funnel contributions that in the aggregate exceed those
limits—there is no good justification for such low triggers with respect to
independent spending for which there are no contribution limits (except with respect
to foreign sources). While it is not settled empirically whether disclosure in fact
chills contributions and so effectively speech and association, there is no reason to
risk such chilling for relatively small donors because public disclosure of their
identities is highly unlikely to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption (it
is hard to imagine a member of Congress changing their vote or legislative agenda
because of so modest a contribution to independent election-related spending) or
provide any useful information to voters. The third change would therefore be to
significantly increase the threshold for trigger disclosure of donor identities, perhaps
to $10,000 (in the aggregate) during a calendar year. Such an increase would also
likely reduce the compliance burden on reporting entities and the enforcement burden
on the FEC, likely even with an expanded range of communications triggering such
disclosure obligations.
b. RESTRUCTURING THE FEC

https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-provides-guidance-following-us-district-court-decision-crew-v-fec-316-fsupp-3d-349-ddc-2018/.
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A bright line set of disclosure rules would also reduce the need to restructure the
FEC, since the discretion of the commissioners would be limited. That said, almost
any statute requires additional guidance to be fully implemented and the current
structure of the FEC—particularly the need for a majority vote of the six
commissioners to proceed with each major step of an enforcement action—appears
to frustrate not only the issuance of reasonable guidance but also enforcement.
Therefore, while not as critical as modifying the disclosure requirements,
restructuring the FEC is likely also important to ensure an effective disclosure
regime.
The existing bipartisan six-commissioner structure is an understandable feature
of the FEC given concerns about the agency being used to harass political opponents
or otherwise give a partisan advantage. But especially given the FEC’s recent track
record,163 a better way to address this concern would be the enactment of clear
statutory rules (limiting the need for potentially controversial guidance) and
delegation of enforcement decisions to career civil servant staff as opposed to
political appointees (as is generally done with other agencies that could be used for
partisan ends, such as the IRS).164 With such changes, the FEC could then have a
single executive with a fixed term (following the model of the FBI and IRS) to
prevent partisan deadlocks and limit partisan influence.165
Alternatively, Congress could maintain the current organizational structure, but,
for disclosure purposes, only delegate enforcement decisions to career civil service
staff. This is less problematic than doing so for enforcement decisions generally,
because disclosure enforcement decisions usually only require forcing recalcitrant
reporting entities to provide clearly required disclosures as opposed to pursuing more
burdensome investigations (and potentially significant fines) associated with other
kinds of election law violations.166 Assuming a relatively detailed and clear statutory
regime, thereby minimizing the need for commissioner-approved guidance, this
delegation of enforcement authority might be sufficient to ensure effective
implementation of the modified disclosure regime.
3. NOT REFORMING STATE NONPROFIT LAWS
Proposals for increasing disclosure of political activity through state nonprofit
laws are unwise and, if the suggested modifications to election law occur,
unnecessary. But even if those suggested modifications do not occur, in part or in

163 See supra note 111.
164 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS
96 (Comm. Print 2000), http://www.jct.gov/s-3-00.pdf (describing IRS policy and the role of political appointees).
165 See I.R.C. § 7803(1)(1)(B) (2018) (detailing the five-year term of the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue); Pub. L. 94-503, Title II, § 203, Oct. 15, 1976, 90 Stat. 2427 (explaining the ten-year term of the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
166 Decisions regarding whether to pursue criminal charges for election law violations are made within
the Department of Justice; while the FEC is generally consulted and retains jurisdiction over civil enforcement
of federal campaign finance laws, it does not control such decisions. See FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION
OFFENSES, supra note 86, at 17–18, 169–70.
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whole, the problems that likely would be created by requiring disclosure through state
nonprofit law are significant enough that such requirements should not be enacted.
More specifically, the state offices charged with enforcing such laws are already
under-resourced and so limited in their ability to enforce those laws. Perhaps more
importantly, those offices are often under the authority of an elected official—often
a state attorney general—which raises the possibility that application and
enforcement of the disclosure laws could be driven by partisan motivations.
CONCLUSION
The increasingly prominent involvement of nonprofits in efforts to support or
oppose candidates for elected public office, including often in violation of existing
federal tax limitations on such activity, is of concern because of its potential to
undermine the reputation of the nonprofit sector as a whole and perhaps respect for
the rule of law more generally. At the same time, such involvement has a positive
aspect in that nonprofits are often vehicles for political engagement by individuals
and important contributors to discussions about the relative merits of candidates. The
question is therefore how to accommodate the legitimate policy concerns relating to
such involvement while not unduly undermining this important role in our
democracy.
The best way to answer to this question is to consider all of the bodies of law
applicable to nonprofit political involvement—federal tax law, election law, and state
nonprofit law—and how they can best address those concerns together. More
specifically, there are sound policy reasons for both requiring the use of after-tax
dollars to fund political activity and for requiring the public disclosure of significant
sources of such funds. But while federal tax law is well-suited to furthering the first
policy by preventing the direct or indirect deduction of political activity expenditures,
it and the IRS are poorly suited to force the detailed and timely disclosure of funding
sources. Federal tax law should therefore be modified to clearly and broadly define
political activity that is not permitted for charitable nonprofits (and spending which
is not eligible to be a deductible business expenses), while permitting noncharitable
nonprofits to engage in such activity without limit, and eliminating the tax law
disclosure provisions for 527s. The one major caveat is that the special nature of inperson communications by religious leaders during worship services at churches
justifies a limited exception to the prohibition on political activity by charities for
such communications.
At the same time, election law is well suited to further the disclosure policy goal
and so should be modified to also clearly and broadly define the political activity that
triggers disclosure. The effectiveness of such disclosure requirements would be
enhanced if the FEC and its state counterparts are also restructured to better ensure
effective application and enforcement of disclosure requirement. Finally, such
requirements should be limited to the disclosure of relatively large sources of funds
(for groups not involved in making legally limited contributions to candidates,
political parties, and PACs).
Together these reforms could restore law and order to the increasingly lawoptional area of nonprofit political activity, while preserving the ability of
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(noncharitable) nonprofits to appropriately engage in political activity, furthering
important governmental interests both in combatting corruption and the appearance
of corruption and informing voters, and sufficiently protecting important First
Amendment values.

